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Role of Culture in Economic Development:
Case Study of China and Latin America
Amira Fellner
ABSTRACT
The purpose of my thesis is to demonstrate the economic development of China
and Latin America. My reason for choosing these two regions for my study is because
they are both Third World Nations. My intention on writing this thesis is to prove that
culture and the informal business networks of China are the major forces of what is
driving the Chinese economy ahead of Latin America.
I will explain how the definition of culture ties in with the economic society of
both regions. In writing about culture, I will attempt to explain if there really is a
difference between trust in each society. To better interpret this thesis, I came up with
several variables of economy that will help explain each region’s development. These
variables are federal direct investment (FDI), labor, and funding of businesses in each
region.
In my study, I present the different approaches that are taken by each region to
attract FDI. In addition, I will explain how and if informal networking is beneficial to the
work force and the funding of businesses in each region.
The majority of my research for this thesis consisted on reviewing past articles of
scholarly journals. From these journals I drew conclusions of my own and compared
ii

them to other scholars’ work. I also analyzed such websites like the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank and various others to be able to come up with
my own findings necessary to complete my thesis.
To anticipate the conclusion, this thesis notes how important it is for each region
to find its own unique way to attract FDI and how culture can impact the development of
an economy. In my thesis, I am including the importance of trust in the society and the
significance of the informal business networks on the Chinese economy.
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Introduction
Historical developments and a region’s culture have an extreme impact on a
country’s economy (Greif, 1994). In addition, a region’s culture strongly defines the
history of economic development. Thus, culture is colossally important in demonstrating
traditions of the society from past to present. Cultural perspectives provide researchers
with references, which exemplify values, attitudes, and behaviors that influence
economic development in China and Latin America. Culture is a combined reflection of
politics and economics in any society. Culture can also be perceived as a type of
productive force. As some Chinese scholars claim, politics, economics and culture are
the three gears of any society and only when they move harmoniously can the whole
society develop rapidly (Xuewen, 1997).
The study of the interaction between culture and economic development is not
new. However, economists often overlook the role of culture in the economic
development of countries. Culture generates assets such as skills, products, expression
and insights that contribute to the social and economic well being of a community. Both
culture and values shape economic development. According to Sen, the values held by a
society will affect economic development efforts (Sen, 1997).
I chose to incorporate the importance of trust in this thesis to demonstrate how it
ties in with economic development. Trust is vital to the social capital of a country. It is
the mutual acceptance between two or more entities that behavior will be honest. Trust is
1

a symbolic credit which enhances the ability of individuals to cooperate and to forgo
short run gains in transactions. Since China and Latin America are both low-trust
regions, I felt that it was important to try to prove that trust is more easily placed within
the Chinese informal networks than Latin America (Tsui, 1997).
Many countries in East Asia, particularly China, are resisting traditions from
Western culture. It is the use of Asian values and institutions that are responsible for the
Chinese economic advancement over Latin America. Despite the fact that the Chinese
and Latin American culture are very similar, what I propose as well is that China has a
more collective society. This is attributed by its Confucian influence. Confucianism
heavily benefits China’s economic development because it encourages savings and places
high value on education. China has a higher level of trust than Latin America being that
it has a homogenous population and a more equal distribution of wealth. According to
Fan and Wang, the more China has been marketized, the higher its trust level is (Fang
and Wang, 2001).
Latin America is very diverse along most human dimensions: ethnicity, language,
culture, history and economic well-being. Despite the diversity, there are common
threads that contribute to the lack of economic development. These include the politycorrupt politicians, the corrupted military and business elites who protect their privileged
positions (Montaner, 2000). Although, Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica have shown some
progress toward human economic development, for the most part, Latin America has an
unresponsive and corrupt bureaucratic structure that hinders the prospect of economic
growth. This includes opportunities for small and medium sized enterprises (Warner,
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2001). Since Latin America is composed of many counties, I find that overall, the society
is very individualistic.
Latin America and China are among the two most active regions in the
developing world for private infrastructure investment. They also receive the bulk of
foreign investment directed at emerging economies. These two regions have also been
evaluated in terms of their economic development progress and their ability to attract
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). By comparing and contrasting both the business and
the cultural aspects of each region, I will demonstrate the advantages that China has over
Latin America’s economy.
I chose to compare Latin America to China because these two regions share some
basic similarities in terms of economic development, colonial history, competition for
FDI, and recent experiences with privatization and other market-opening initiatives.
Additionally, policy makers within the Latin American region often point to the
economic development paths followed by China as prescriptive models.
While explaining each region’s society and economy, I also elaborate on how
corruption is portrayed and how it factors out in economic development. For the
purpose of my thesis, I have used the definition provided by Robert Williams to best
describe corruption: abuse of public office to for private gain (Williams, 2000).
According to economists, corruption increases transaction costs, reduces investment
incentives, and, therefore, reduces economic growth. In countries with high levels of
corruption, the public is hostile to people who have more. Taking this into account, I
explained how corruption is portrayed in each of these regions, being that both China and
Latin America both have corrupted political and economic systems.
3

Throughout this thesis, economic development will be the increase in the ability
to choose and make decisions for the maximum number of people during the maximum
length of time that will result in a sustainable increase in material and social welfare.
This in turn will give allowances for both interpersonal and intergenerational criteria.
I will be using the cultural approach to explain why China and Latin America
have had different economic performances during the past several decades. I will attempt
to answer how important the cultural factors are in the economic performances of the two
regions. In this thesis, I will review the notion of culture and the relationship between
culture and economic development.
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Chapter One
How Culture is Applied to Capital
For the purpose of my thesis, culture is defined as the socially transmitted
behavior, patterns, norms, beliefs and values of a given community. Others would have
that culture “is a set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs that
characterize national, ethnic, and other groups and orient their behavior” (Faure and
Sjostedt, 1993). According to Samuel Huntington, culture is the values, attitudes, beliefs,
and underlying assumption prevalent among peoples in a society. Culture is dynamic,
interactive, and synergistic, and it intermixes with all the elements of a society, especially
economic development and the milieu of entrepreneurs (Huntington, 2000).
Culture is measured by indicators of individual values and beliefs, such as trust
and respect for others, and confidence in individual self-determination. Culture, like
institutions, is a vague concept. Culture corresponds to the social norms and individual
beliefs that sustain equilibria as focal points in repeated social interactions (Greif, 1994).
In this interpretation, culture is one aspect of broadly defined institutions and contributes
to shape individual incentives. A more radical view is that culture directly influences
individual behavior through values and preferences (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Others
have pointed out that social norms and individual values could interact in systematic
fashions (Benabou and Tirole, 2006).
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Sociologists have tended to believe that cultural norms pervade economic life and
that to understand economy it cannot be separated from culture. Many economists point
out that the differences in economic performance from one society to another are better
explained by differences in institutions and in the policies undertaken by those
institutions than by cultural factors (Bell, 1994). Culture also affects the ability of
societies to create and properly manage institutions. For example, in the postwar period
Japan, South Korea and other East Asian countries employed industrial policies, in which
the state rather than the market allocated credit to national industries to encourage
economic growth.
The notion of culture has witnessed changes from time to time. More than one
hundred years ago, E.B. Taylor defined culture in his book Primitive Culture where he
defined culture as the complex whole which included knowledge, belief, art, morals, and
customs acquired by man as a member of society (Greif, 1994). In the middle of this
century, A.L. Kroeber described culture in his Anthropology as consisting of speech,
knowledge, and beliefs that is learned from other man and elders (Kroeber, 1948). In
Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, A.L Kroeber and Clyde
Kluckhohm stated that culture consists of patterns, both explicit and implicit of behavior
acquired and transmitted by symbols, consisting the distinctive achievements of human
groups, including their embodiment in artifacts (Kroeber and Kluckhohm, 1952). They
said that the essence of culture consists of traditional ideas. In short, culture is the total
social heritage acquired by man as a member of the society.
Culture is shared and distinctive forms or patterns, that shapes human behavior,
and its essence is the values embodied in the beliefs of the people. This makes value
6

orientation patterns the essential features of culture (Alexander and Kumaran, 1992). In
discussing the relationship between culture and development, Gao Xian raises he issue of
macro-culture. He points out that macro-culture includes not only culture in the narrow
sense (art and literature), but also culture in the broadest sense (Xian, 1996). Therefore,
the macro-culture approach to development is a holistic exploration of the development
process, material and moral, current and historical partial and total. According to Xian,
the macro-culture approach primarily addresses the issue of an objective attitude towards
tradition and their relationship between traditional culture and modernization
development (Xian, 1996). In discussing the notion of culture, we also need to pay
attention to a nation’s tradition. According to Xian, tradition is what a society inherits
from its history and which forms the norms of morality, concept of values, modes of
behavior, methods of thinking and ideas (Xian, 1996). This serves as the foundation of
the cultural identity of that particular society.
However, tradition should not be seen as good or completely bad. In other words,
in dealing with tradition, people should not blindly accept everything past, nor get rid of
the tradition because it is totally harmful. Traditions, which are very closely linked to
culture, should be renewed and improved constantly. Mao Zedong once said “Our
national history goes back several thousand years and has its own characteristics”
(Zedong, 1952).
It has been acknowledged that the primary aim of the contemporary era is to seek
development and peace. In pinpointing the causes of underdevelopment, some people
would put more emphasis on external factors, such as a long history of colonial
dominance and exploitation, unequal exchanges and the absence of a just international
7

economic order. However, it is also necessary to pay attention to internal factors.
Development is the result of both external and internal factors and in many cases, internal
factors should always play a more important role.
In terms of internal factors determining economic development, people are
increasingly emphasizing the non-economic ones like culture. As Augusto Salazar
Bondy stated, underdevelopment is a state of mind, a way of expression, and a collective
personality marked by chronic infirmities and forms of maladjustments (Harrison, 1985).
Similar institutions created in Latin America and other parts of the world proved
much less effective than their Chinese counterparts. While effective industrial policy is
partly a matter of institutional design, it is also heavily influenced by culture.
As the world has become richer and better educated, religion has not withered and
nationalism and tribalism have not faded away (Hofsted and Bonds, 1988). Global
economy and technological forces do not erode local cultures and values. Instead, culture
and values shape economic development. For instance, when we look at China’s
economy, it is important to look at the fact that China has a long and complex history as
well as a rich cultural tradition. China’s cultural traditions still continue to exert a strong
influence on almost every aspect of human interaction, including business.
Cultural differences have become more pronounced as people are empowered by
greater wealth and education. Once worldviews have been absorbed, they produce
different levels and types of social and cultural capital.
Culture extends across all the dimensions of the social capital of a society,
underlying the basic components of social capital such as mutual confidence and
responsible civic behavior. The values held by a society will affect development efforts.
8

The ethical codes used by businessmen and professionals form part of the productive
resources of a society. According to Sen if these codes place emphasis on values in
keeping with the project of development with equity, they will favor development (Sen,
1997). Values rooted deeply in the prevailing culture are essential for sustained
development.
UNESCO emphasized that culture is a key element in the fight against poverty
(UNESCO, 1995). The poor have their own values that are often all they have to assert.
Under-privileged groups have values, which give them an identity of their own. If these
values are not respected, then, even the best productive proposals can be blocked.
Preserving cultural values is very important for development.
Taking culture into account requires integrating information about culture into
development economic analysis in an informed way. It is evident that culture exerts real
effects on development outcomes and development projects. Cultural differences might
also influence governmental tendencies to structure foreign investment along certain
dimensions.
China has been able to organize their economy more efficiently because of their
continued reliance of guanxi and their informal networks in spite of their economic
reform. China is a country that has distinctive political, institutional, and cultural
characteristics, and it is recognized that such factors can give rise to different modes of
economic organization.
Another category in which culture is said to affect economic behavior is the
formation of social networks. The differing impact of cultural values on networks of
social relations is the basis for the concept of social capital. Social networks affect
9

economic growth via enforcing informal institutions. My thesis focuses on the economic
payoff of kinship networks in the context of China’s industrialization to argue that kin
solidarity and trust plays an important role in China’s advancement in the economic
world over Latin America. Reform economies, such as China, strive with informal
institutions because informal norms are much more impervious to deliberate designing
and take time to change.
Another factor that affects economic development is trust. Although both China
and Latin America are low-trust societies, there is more trust within the Chinese informal
networks than Latin America (Tzu, 1997). To define trust, I will use Francis Fukuyama’s
definition. Trust is the mutual acceptance among two or more entities (persons,
organizations) that regular day-to-day behavior will be honest, cooperative, and
predictable based on shared norms. Also, that parties to markets transaction will not
exploit others vulnerabilities (Fukuyama, 1995). Trust is a measure of how people
evaluate the moral fabric in their society. When dealing with specific nations, there are
different levels of trust that must be taken into consideration.
The importance of trust gives a positive outlook at the societal level. Cities,
regions, and countries with more trusting people are more inclined to have better working
democratic institutions, to have more open economies, greater economic growth, and less
crime and corruption. Countries with an initial level of high inequality and with
dishonest governments are less likely to establish universal programs (Child, 2005). This
is because such programs are usually based on the idea that all groups in society have a
shared fate. People will place their trust only in their own groups or class.
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In low-trust societies, such as those in Latin America with high degree of
economic inequality, universal programs are likely to fail because of the lack of potential
support. Latin America has felt the impact of low trust on economic development. For
the most part, Latin America is stuck in the backwardness of social and governance
dysfunction. It is imperative for entrepreneurs to create trust and social capital in order
for the economy to be successful. The more trust there is the better it is for human
progress and economic development. According to Evans and Flora, low-trust societies
are filled with traditional values and corrupt bureaucratic structures, and the prospect of
good economic development is not promising (Evans and Flora, 1996). In Latin
America, since there is a lack of trust, it has been difficult to stimulate entrepreneurial
activity and investment in business development leading to more jobs, innovation, and
increased productivity; factors that the Chinese bode well in.
Trust is a vital part of the social capital of a country that includes institutions,
networks, and attitudes. Social development in the form of higher trust is supposed to be
strongly related to economic development. The higher trust encourages economic
development and at the same time, economic development promotes trust especially in
the long run. However, it is possible that the relationship between trust and growth will
work in opposite directions. According to Fukuyama, because trust depends on
expectations about future actions of others, the formation of expectations in a situation of
growth should positively affect our propensity to trust others (Fukuyama, 1995).
Furthermore, it is possible that in a situation of growth individuals are willing to take
higher risks in trusting others because of higher potential benefits. Fukuyama’s
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assumption is that trust is a product of inherited and inflexible patterns of cultural
inheritance.
Trust influences the decision of whether to invest or not only in low-income
countries where trust between investor and recipient replaces absent, formal institutions.
In high-income countries, trust affects investment choices by reallocating funds across
sectors. Individuals who take higher risks might invest in future technologies where they
expect high future returns on their investment. In contrast, missing trust might determine
the preference for more secure investment options. It is imperative for entrepreneurs to
create trust and social capital in order for the economy to be successful. The more trust
there is the better it is for human progress and economic development. According to
Evans and Flora, low-trust societies are filled with traditional values and corrupt
bureaucratic structures, and the prospect of good economic development is not promising
(Evans and Flora, 1996).
When there is economic progress, the importance of trust increases because the
exchange system becomes more complex, the probability of repeated interaction falls and
specialization deepens. All in all, the promotion of trust encourages domestic exchange
and therefore, economic progress through size and specialization is stimulated.
Trust encourages growth and economic development by affecting the efficiency
of production, exchange, formal institutions and governmental actions. Formal
institutions stimulate production and exchange but also employ resources from
productive and commercial activities, becoming sources of inefficiencies. Reducing
transaction costs, uncertainties and information restrictions, increases the efficiency of
formal institutions. Furthermore, formal institutions do not cover the entirety of
12

economic activities and such institutions have to be enforced by a third party (ex, courts,
or the government).
Similarly, trust raises the efficiency of government performance. While some
economic activities based on trust may also foster inefficiencies, in general trust increases
the efficiency of an economy. This view parallels that of Edward T. Hall and Mildred
Reed Hall, who say that culture can be compared with a giant, extraordinary complex,
subtle computer. Its progress guides the actions and responses of human beings in every
walk of life (Hall and Reed Hall, 1990).
It is imperative to point out that, although the cultural factor is important, its
importance should not be exaggerated. In other words, compared with other internal
factors determining economic performance, cultural factors occupy a lower position than
economic policies. Culture only serves to facilitate or hinder the creation of an
environment where sound economic policies can be made and implemented.

Chinese Culture
The last few decades have seen remarkable economic progress in China and their
achievements are impressive. This success has been accompanied by the emergence of
new theories on the role of the Chinese culture in achieving economic success (Frank,
2003). An emerging theory attributes these successes largely to the role of
Confucianism. This theory has been followed more recently by the rapid transformation
of the Chinese economy and society. Attention has now shifted to the special virtues of
Confucianism, including the cultural tie binding China and much of East Asia.
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The Confucian culture originated in China, but its influence has expanded to the
whole East Asian region. Confucianism has three significant stages of development. The
days of Confucius mark the beginning stage of Confucianism. The second stage is the
School of Principle and the Ming Dynasty during the Song Dynasty (960-1280 A.D.).
Currently, we are in the third stage of Confucianism, called the “renaissance” of
Confucianism (Zhang, 2001). These proponents claim that Confucianism will continue
to occupy a pivotal position in China’s cultural traditions, as well as to contribute to the
modernization process in this country. Some people contend that Confucianism will
continue to manifest valuable positive points and play a role in the modernization
process.
Confucianism has many components. Zhang Hongyi lists the following: 1)
Economic functioning should rely on comprehensive harmony, consistency with natural
laws, human supremacy and avoiding extremes. 2) Economic relations should be used to
curtail selfishness and reduce inequality. 3) Economic behaviors should emphasize using
small ways of making fortunes, living a thrifty life and working hard. 4) Economic
policies of the government should stress making people rich and reducing poverty. 5)
Economic management should highlight efficient government. 6) Economic life should
be integrated with economic morality (Hongyi, 1989).
Confucianist ethics is best summarized by Herman Kahn in his World Economic
Development: 1979 and Beyond (1979). He states that Confucianism promotes a high
value on education, a desire for accomplishments in various skills, and seriousness about
tasks, job, family, and obligations in the individual and the family. There is very little
interest in advancing individual interests (Kahn, 1979).
14

Westerners, such as Christopher Engholm, agree that Confucianism inculcates
diligence, hard work and family devotion. For Keun Lee, Confucian values and
traditions include stress on worldly achievement, discipline, and a commitment to
education. These qualities are what Max Weber found in the Protestant ethic, which
played a decisive role in developing Western capitalism.
While many scholars believe that Confucianism possess certain advantages over
the other traditions, such as the Ibero-Catholic or Hispanic heritage in Latin America in
promoting economic development, other scholars point out that simplistic cultural
arguments yield several problems. According to Gary Geretti, these problems include: 1)
Timing-the Confucian and Ibero-Catholic traditions have existed for centuries, but the
dynamic shifts in economic performance that gave rise to the East Asia have occurred in
recent decades. 2) Discussions of culture have been as inconsistent as the same Confucian
beliefs that are now claimed to facilitate rapid industrialization in East Asia.
Despite the debate, there are still several codes determined to be beneficial to
economic development. One of them is that Confucianist culture encourages thrift and
savings, which in turn benefits the growth of investment. No economy can grow unless
surpluses are created that can increase the economy’s productive capacity. Economic
development relies heavily on investment of physical capital in the form of roads,
machine tools, and telephones. In 1965, investment rates in East Asia equaled about 20%
of GDP, only a shade above the figure in Latin America. By 1990 the East Asian
investment rate was 35% more than twice the Latin American investment rate (Rohwer,
1995).
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Another code is that Confucian beliefs place a high value on education. This, in
turn, promotes the development of human resources. Long before the European
Renaissance, Confucianism heavily influenced education in China. Many other scholars
emphasize the importance of investment in education. In Economics Value of Education,
Theodore Schutts mentioned the following impacts that education had to economic
development: it improves the quality of labor through the promotion of skills, efficiency
and work knowledge; education increases labor mobility to promote division of labor and
to strengthen labor force participation rates; scientific and technical knowledge is
increased to promote invention; entrepreneurs gain more ability to improve management
and the allocation of production factors, and people become more responsive to economic
change (Schutts, 1967).
In spite of the impact that Confucianism has on China’s education, it is erroneous
to say that Latin American countries totally ignore education. Higher education in that
region has advanced remarkably. However, primary education has developed at a slow
rate in Latin America. China spends more on primary schooling then on secondary
schooling.
The final code of Confucianism is that it stresses work ethic. According to Jack
Barbash, work is an end, which is expected to bring the reward of material success.
Work includes the discipline of work, punctuality, obedience, and diligence. The
Confucianist teaching has it that working is a virtue, which, in turn can create high
morality for anyone. Laziness generates immorality and degradation (Barbash, 1983).
In the past two decades, China’s transition from a planned to a market system
followed a different path from those countries in Eastern Europe. China’s economic
16

reform and transition to a market system occurred without democratization, liberalization
proceeded incrementally and privatization was delayed until recently.
Since 1949, the Chinese economy had been closed to the Western countries.
When the conflict with the Soviet block broke in the early 1960’s, the Chinese economy
became one of the most closed economies in the world. During the “Cultural
Revolution” from 1966-1975, no advertising was allowed because the Chinese economy
was managed through the Soviet five-year plan (Zhang, 1996). After 1978, when the
open-door policy was adopted, China evolved from an egalitarian Marxist state to a more
socialist market economy, which was oriented toward economic development and
modernization. In 1979, the government decided to expand foreign trade and welcome
foreign investment. As a result, China is charging ahead in its efforts to become one of
the key global economies.
China has had one of the highest growth rates in the world over the past quarter of
a century. Enormous capital inflows and cheap migrant labor have fuelled economic
growth, making China the world’s factory. For the most part, China’s economic success
has occurred in the absence of democracy. It is true that freedom of speech is tolerated
now more than at any other time since the founding of the People’s Republic and there is
a growing majority of social interests reflected in the emergence of village selfgovernment. However, these changes have not been reflected in greater tolerance
(Marshall, 2006).
Studies by political scientists have found that economic growth generates
demands for political rights. At one level, casual practices also seem to support the view
that economic growth promotes democracy in that all the developed, industrialized
17

nations have democratic political systems. On the contrary, most nations in the poorest
segment of the world operate under various non-democratic political systems. But, with
simple observation, one can see that this is not true. Casual observation also suggests
that economic growth does not necessarily bring about a demand for democracy. There
are examples of authoritarian regimes in South-east Asia and the Middle East where
citizens are willing to forgo demand for political liberalization, provided their economic
needs are being met (Smyth, 2007). It is only when the authoritarian government stop
delivering on the economic front that there are calls for more political rights.
An example is the fall of the Soeharto regime in Indonesia following the Asian
financial crisis, when spiraling inflation and unemployment prevented Soeharto from
delivering in the economic sphere. In China, the fact is that the government is delivering
on the economic front. The urban population at least has experienced a substantial
improvement in living standards since the start of the late 1970’s (Child, 2005).
Corruption can exist in democracies and dictatorships. China has a serious
problem with corruption. Some see corruption as undermining China’s growth prospects
into the 21st century; but corruption does not need to be detrimental to economic growth.
While some studies have found that corruption have desirable properties for growth. The
latter perspective suggests corruption can act as a lubricant that makes it easier for
business to get things done by cutting through bureaucratic red tape and thereby
increasing the efficiency of the economy.
Hong Kong economist Steven Cheung has suggested that corruption is more
likely to flourish under democracy rather than dictatorship. Cheung’s rationales for his
position is that in an authoritarian regime people on top want to maintain their hold on
18

power and corruption is one thing that will most likely destroy this. Thus, the cost of
corruption is high for single-party states. But in a democracy, because power is transient,
there is more incentive for elected officials to profit while they can (Smyth, 2007).
Cheung’s view, however, overlooks subtleties between regime types.
There are three factors that lead to believe that corruption has different economic
implications depending on the context in which it occurs. The first is comparative
advantage. Economies inhabit different niches in the international division of labor, and
these may require different sets of institutional capacities (Hall and Soskice, 2001). For
instance, corruption may be weakening if a country is competing for trade and investment
with countries where corruption is much less prevalent, but it may constitute less of a
problem if it is competing mainly with countries that are equally plagued by corruption.
The second factor is political organization. It is argued that the organization of
the corruption network has implications for both the level of corruption and the effect on
economic activity (Shliefer and Vishny, 1993). One of the distinctions made is between a
regime in which the person paying the bribe is assured that he gets the government good
that he is paying for, and a regime in which numerous bureaucrats need to be bribed to
get a government permit, and bribing one does not guarantee that some other bureaucrat
or even the first one does not demand another bribe (Shliefer and Vishny, 1993). Kahn
notes that the effects of corruption are specific to the particular distribution of power
between the states and competing groups of potential clients (Kahn, 1996). This makes it
possible for similar corrupt transactions to have different effects in different countries.
The third factor is rent creation. This factor explains that besides corruption being
regarded as rent seeking, it is also both a response to situations where rent already exist,
19

and an incentive for state officials to create new rents. This latter point is one of the keys
to understanding the economic impact of corruption. Many rents exist because of the
opportunities for corruption they create. However, different types of rents have different
implications for economic efficiency and growth. Thus, there is a distinction between
growth-reducing rents, generally growth-enhancing rents, and rents that have
undetermined effects on economic growth, depending on the institutional context, which
include rent-like transfer and rent for monitoring (Khan and Sundaram, 2000). When
China launched economic reforms, its comparative advantage lay in low-tech, laborintensive production. In this stage, China competed for investment and export markets
with other low-wage economies, many of which were also highly corrupt (Wei and
Sievers, 2000).
Often, analysts make the mistake of equating formal structures with
organizational capacity. It is, however, important to recognize that it is possible for states
with formally centralized institutional structures to behave in a fragmented way if
powerful but dispersed interest groups can prevent co-ordination by state agencies (Kahn,
2000). Conversely, states and society that are formally fragmented may nevertheless
have the capacity to coordinate corrupt activities. The Chinese communist party retained
its ability to control corruption, which paved the way for strong economic growth
(Blanchard and Sclieifer, 2000).
In China, the large variation in the patterns of corruption at provincial as well as
local level suggest that the Chinese state and party agencies have in fact not been able to
effectively control or coordinate corruption and other forms of rent seeking. Pei has
argued that “Rampant corruption in post-Mao China arose because the decentralization of
20

power was accompanied by low-levels of accountability and a lack of civic participation
(Pei, 2001). The continued power of the communist party suggests that China may have
been in a better position to impose some semblance of order on corruption. However, the
political turmoil unleashed by corruption in the form of pro-democracy demonstrations of
1989 indicates that the Chinese communist party was unable to restrain the predatory
behavior of cadres. In the market reform era, organized crime has expanded on a massive
scale under the political patronage of local officialdom (Chen, 2005). Corruption
intensified in the sense that it increasingly involved big-stakes corruption rather than
ordinary forms of official malfeasance (Wedeman, 2004).
Chinese officials have had to create rents more compatible with efficiency and
long-term growth. Chinese policy makers have been more inclined to engage in rent-like
transfers of a growth-enhancing nature (Pei, 2001). These transfers have encouraged new
entrants to markets and intensified competition. The effect of these rent-like transfers has
been to promote new entrants into high-rent markets.
In China, bureaucratic resources have increasingly been put to use to enhance
rather than restrict competition. Local state governments account for a substantial
portion of all the entrepreneurial activity in China. Duckett argues that these activities,
which may be illegal, tend to be productive rather than profiteering, since the local
entrepreneurial state is removed from the centralized administrative control of the
command economy and operates in an increasingly competitive market economy
(Duckett, 2001). These economic activities are not characterized by monopoly and may
promote the growth of competitive markets.
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Duckett also argued that corruption in reform-era China has taken two main
forms. First, corruption has served as a means for non-state actors to develop alongside
the planned economy, dominated by large state owned actors. Second, corruption
became a means by which local governments competed for favors from the central
government (Duckett, 2000). These favors took the form of both preferential financial
treatment and flexibility of the kind initially accorded only to special economic zones.
Thus, political zones have contributed to the establishment and spread of competitive and
growth-enhancing markets and institutions (Wedeman, 2004).

Latin American Culture
The Latin American region is composed of many countries, each of which has its
own cultural identity. As Frederick Turner states, whereas some social scientists view
political culture as a national phenomenon encompassing the distinctive values of each
national community, shaped by the community’s distinctive history, others feel that there
is a Latin culture that defines the region as a whole (Turner, 1995).
After separating from Spain, each nation in Latin America created their own
social characteristics with local traditions and histories. Lawrence Harrison believes that
values, attitudes, and culture are what differentiates ethnic groups and is responsible for
Latin America’s persistent instability and inequality (Harrison, 1992). Latin America
still possesses a dominant Iberian Catholic political culture. Religion, culture, language,
and history are all important to understanding the institutional framework through which
development is filtered and the shaping of economic development. According to Wiarda,
Latin America remains authoritarian, Catholic, and elitist (Wiarda, 1992).
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Latin America has a long history of social activism and is the source of many
studies chronicling successes and failures of culture as forces of societal well-being or
backwardness. Trust, social capital and civil society are conditions that are studied and
that aim to benefit people at the lower end of the socio-politico-economic scale. None of
the twenty republics in Latin America can be classified as developed, and some remain
poor. Pockets of wealth are found in all republics; however, these cannot conceal the
deprivation and hardship suffered by the region’s poorest inhabitants. Although Latin
America is not among the poorest regions in the world, it has been overtaken by parts of
Asia, such as China that had much lower standards of living throughout the nineteenth
century.
Latin America is very diverse along the following human dimension: ethnicity,
language, and history. It has been found that there are several elite groups that have
contributed to the lack or backwardness of economic development in Latin America.
Montaner identifies them as the polity-corrupt and wrong-headed politician; the militarysometimes imposing their own systems of occupation and social justice; the business
elite-protecting their privileged positions; the clergy-using their altruistic quest, which
often leads to anti-markets actions, the intellectuals-espousing views that have little
credibility when laid alongside to the United State; and the left-which are the
revolutionaries, who at times oppose everything (Montaner, 2000).
The Latin American culture is understood through the concepts of power,
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, context, and time orientation
(Hofstede, 1980). Power orientation is the manner in which people in a culture defer to
legitimate authority in societal structures. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which a
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culture relies upon, and expects information to accomplish a task. Individualism is the
degree to which a culture emphasizes the well-being of a group over the benefit of an
individual; and masculinity is a culture’s perspective about the roles that men and women
play in society. Context is the “pattern of physical cues, environmental stimuli, and
implicit understanding that convey meaning between two members of the same culture”
(Thill and Bovee, 2005). Lastly, time orientation describes the culture’s attitude towards
time. Time is infinite in Latin American culture.
The problems that Latin America faces are many. It is a very low-trust society
and the radius of trust is very narrow compared to that of China. Low trust limits
opportunities for economic growth and innovation. There is a cultural heritage of not
trusting others. Another problem is the persistence of the dependency theory. Harrison
and Huntington both agree that in order for Latin America to grow economically, there
must be a shift from the dependency theory toward a more open-market democratization
process (2000). Other proponents who believe that culture does matter in economic
development, and that the dependency theory should be done away with are Max Weber
and Landes (Weber & Landes, 1998). As Landes puts it, “culture makes almost all the
difference.” Inglehart also claims that culture’s trust, tolerance, and values are crucial for
economic development (Inglehart, 2000). Trust is necessary and it is also a major
resource for starting and sustaining new enterprises (Cohen, & Fields, 1998).
For the most part, Latin America is stuck in the backwardness of social and
governance dysfunction. In Latin America, since there is a lack of trust, it has been
difficult to stimulate entrepreneurial activity and investment in business development
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leading to more jobs, innovation, and increased productivity; factors that the Chinese
bode well in (Thomson, 2007).
Latin America has seen many decades of dysfunctional polity, which has
decimated many traditional cultural and social structures. Therefore, this has left many
Latin American societies bereft of trust and social capital (De Ferranti, 2004).
In a study created by M.B. Neace, with the purpose of giving understanding to the
significance of trust, it was found that the entrepreneurs that he interviewed over the past
decade that have succeeded have done so by developing socio-economic networks, built
on trust of their own behavior. Neace concluded that trustworthy entrepreneurs have a
contagion impact throughout their networks. As the enterprises gain market success, the
trust component becomes more important, which serves as an inspiration to members of
the networks because of the realization of both social and financial rewards (Neace,
2004). This kind of success leads to respect for diversity, necessary for innovation and
increasing productivity, elevating levels of civil society in communities where these
socioeconomic networks are active. As Cohen and Fields put it, trust and social capital
created by entrepreneurs have benefits for the larger society far beyond their immediate
organizations (Cohen & Fields, 1998).
In developing countries like Colombia, long-term economic progress depends on
the growing networks of small entrepreneurial enterprises (Birch, 1979). For many of the
economies in the Latin American countries, their progress requires a dynamic interaction
of culture and trust among a host of actors.
Several countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Mexico have started
to move toward civility but the results are mixed. Argentina currently faces some civil
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unrest and economic downfalls because of poor governances regarding the economic
policy (World Bank, 2006). In fact, Latin America is faced with poor governance,
particularly Colombia, which is no stranger to civil unrest. Civil unrest is attributed to
low levels of trust. As Fukuyama puts it, economic development parallels the movement
toward democratization, the growth of civil society, and a culture that has a high amount
of trust (Fukuyama, 1995).
Consideration and due appreciation of the culture of under-privileged sectors is a
key point in the crucial matter of collective identity and self-esteem. Poverty is often
accompanied by the depreciation of cultural values (USA Today, 2006, Nov. 28). Others
look down the culture of the poor upon as being inferior and backward. Cultural patterns
of the poor are sometimes blamed for being responsible for their poverty. Not
appreciating their culture means weakening their identity, and that weakening can lead to
feelings of low individual and collective self-esteem.
In the recent decades, Latin America has witnessed corruption in all aspects of
society. This has ultimately resulted in reduced economic growth. Using data on
national level of corruption from 1997 and individual opinion from 1995-1997, it was
found that Latin America is aware of the seriousness of corruption in their countries
(Transparency International 1997, CPI index). Pervasive misconduct may poison public
sentiment toward democratic politics.
Political corruption is a significant problem in Latin America, where corruption
scandals tarnished many Latin American governments in the 1990’s (Gould, 2006). In
Brazil, President Fernando Collor de Mello was forced to resign following a chain of
scandals involving an influence-peddling ring during the electoral campaign, and reports
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of a lavish private life. In Venezuela, Carlos Andres Perez was suspended from the
presidency in the midst of impeachment proceedings that were initiated following news
of his misappropriation of public funds. In Ecuador, the media uncovered evidence that
President Bucaram stashed away for himself money that had been raised during a
Christmas telethon to help the poor. This triggered a political process ending with his
removal by Congress for mental incapacity (Stapenhurst, 2000). Recent history in Latin
America illustrates both the extent of corruption at the national level and the difficulties
of combating it. Since the early 1990’s, nine Latin American presidents or former
presidents have faced judicial proceedings or have been dismissed on corruption charges.
Political corruption raises several issues regarding the relationship between
citizens and their governments. At one level, when the highest authorities are frequently
implicated in electoral manipulation, financial scandals, or the abuse of public resources
to achieve personal benefits, their bases of authority and legitimacy may be undermined.
At another level, corruption constitutes a violation of the unwritten contract between
citizens and public official. Political corruption distorts public demands, increases the
cost, reduces quality, and delay the competition of public works. It also delays access to
public administration for those people who do not pay bribes and reduces the productivity
of all those involved with the state (Delia Porta, 2000).
Corruption reduces investment and slows growth for a variety of reasons. Either
parties to the transaction do not report bribes. This denies the treasury needed tax
revenues. Public services are focused toward assisting those who pay bribes, denying
those services to those who do not. Bribes enable service providers to ignore established
standards and offer substandard goods or services from which the economy suffers.
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Corruption also weakens the rule of law. As a result, the transactions are made irrational
from an economic point of view.
The World Bank found that among countries in which bribery was both high and
unpredictable, the rate of investment was half of what it was in low-corruption companies
(World Bank, 1997). High levels of corruption encourage businesses to go underground,
which denies the government tax revenue and produces smaller, less effective
governments. While corruption may have had its positive functions under dictatorships,
it is seen as being dysfunctional under democracy. Della Porta argues that corruption is
both a cause and an effect of poor government performance (Della Porta, 2000).
Therefore, it reduces trust and the governments’ capacity to address citizens’ demands.
Two decades after Latin America began returning from authoritarian rule to
democracy, public opinion in the region remains very conflicted. In most of Latin
America, the majority of the public accepts democracy as the best form of government
(Kauffman and Mastruzzi, 2005). But, there are many countries that have sizeable
pockets of authoritarian sentiment. Most Latin Americans are skeptical about key
institutions of democracy, and Latin Americans manifest some of the lowest levels of
interpersonal trust observed anywhere in the world (Payne, Zovatto , Carrillo, and Zavala,
2002).
There is a relative stability of public attitudes and values in Latin America. Many
countries in the region are not showing sufficient changes in their political and social
culture to indicate movement toward democratic consolidation. In countries such as
Colombia and Venezuela, public opinion data indicate that democracy is in serious
difficulty. Democracy in these two regions has had a poor performance, which has
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contributed to the decline of popular democratic commitment. Economic difficulties in
these countries have also been a contributing factor.
Political institutions command a low level of trust in Latin America. Low levels
of trust among people constitute a declining feature of Latin American political culture.
This low level of confidence in other people derives from a common regional heritage of
distrust. This includes the hierarchical structure of authority at many levels and the
passivity of citizens towards the patron, the local boss, and the state. People are still
accustomed to hoping that someone will solve their problems for them as opposed to
solving it him or herself. Now they look to democracy to solve all of their problems.
Latin Americans want democracy because they see it as a new type of patron. As Marta
Lagos contends, “these people want the rights but not the obligations of citizenship”
(Lagos, 2006).
Official corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency aggravate another problem in
emergent economies by slowing down access to credit, thus making it difficult to create
businesses and generate employment. For the poor, access to credit is almost impossible,
given the difficulties they encounter in establishing legal ownership of their assets. In an
interview with PBS, Peruvian economist de Soto credited the lack of property rights as
the main reason why capitalism has not yielded the anticipated results in Latin American
and other underdeveloped areas (de Soto, 1989). In the long run, the fact is that by
denying the majority of the population full participation in the economy the system is
endangering the implementation of economic reforms crucial to the prosperity of the
nation.
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Political clientelism has been a recurrent theme in studying the links between the
poor masses and political elites in Latin America. Clientelism has been examined as one
of the possible relationships between the poor masses and political elites in Latin
America. At a time when public discourse is dominated by neo-liberal rhetoric that
stresses the salutary retreat of the state from markets, Javier Auyero argues that politics,
and personal ties are important for gaining access to resources. Clientelist networks are
important because they fulfill the functions that the state is abandoning (Auyero, 2000).
In Latin America, the widespread material deprivation, persistent joblessness and
misery, and unmerciful economic pressure in the working-class neighborhoods have been
caused by a combination of factors: the languishing of the wage-labor economy; the
casualization of blue-collar jobs, and state-neglect provoked by structural adjustment
policies.
According to Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, there is a need for reforming the Latin
American economy (Ffrench, Davis, 2005). Short-term macroeconomic balances affect
long-term economic performance (Ffrench-Davis and Tapia, 2004). However, a policy
that increases the rate of use of productive factors will contribute to long-term growth
only if its positive effects are permanent.
Latin American countries (LACs) economic reforms in the 1990s (trade and
financial liberalization, large privatization processes, fiscal reforms), may have
contributed to a recovery in actual GDP, but it was coupled only by a temporary and
slight rise in capital formation. What is argued to be needed are more structural reforms.
Fostering investment must be given priority. After the implementation of liberalizing
reforms in LACs, economic growth has been disappointing and investment rates have
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reached historical minimum levels. Even in the three peak years of 1994, 1997 and 2004,
productive investment was low compared to ratios in East Asia (MOFTEC, 2005).
Economic reforms aimed to make room for private agents in a market economy have
ended up damaging the environment for investment, challenging the long-term
development of the private sector.
Economically, the greatest differences between the liberalization efforts of LACs
and the way in which Asian countries, such as China have opened up their economies are
that most Latin American liberalization programs have been carried out rapidly and the
state has played a passive role (IDB, 1998). Whereas in China, for example, the
economy has been a long, state-led process, involving the construction of a production
apparatus oriented towards international markets.
Most Latin American governments have only recently responded more positively
to the need for modernization programs with sound macroeconomics. Among those
analyzing economic reform in Latin America, there is growing recognition of the cultural
or institutional factor as it operates on leaders. Countries with institutions of Spanish
origin are characterized by personal relationships that often impede political stability and
broadly based and shared economic growth. As Nobel Prize winner Douglas North
wrote, “Informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are
much more impervious to deliberate policies” (North, 1990). North traced Latin
America’s limited and unequal development to the deep-seated inheritance from Spain.
Mexico’s Nobel Prize author Octavio Paz pointed out the following:
Though Spanish-American civilization is to be admired on many counts, it
reminds one of a structure of great solidity-at once convent, fortress, and
palace built to last, not to change. In the long run, that construction
became a confine, a prison (Paz, 1979).
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The region constituted by Latin America as a whole has the highest level of
inequality in the world, as mentioned before, and during the last three decades of the 20th
century, inequality increased in most countries of the region (Morley, 2001). There is
consensus that this inequality is a serious obstacle to both poverty reduction and
economic growth (Economic commission on Latin America and the Caribbean [ECLAC],
2004).
Inequalities in landholding and political power originating in the colonial order
are at the center of theoretical explanations for the deep roots of inequality in Latin
America. After Independence, inequalities in assets and income was conditioned by
reinforced inequality in political influence, and thus, in political institutions policies.
This, in turn, perpetuated the vicious cycle of inequality. Latin America has a weaken
record of democracy, less consolidated parties, and weaker organizations of the
underprivileged, weaker labor unions and weaker parties of the left (Bradley et al. 2003).
The weakness of democracy obstructed the formation of strong political parties in
general, and combined with the weakness of labor, hampered the development of parties
to the left of center. This hampered forces that could build the redistributive capacity of
the state and shape a model of political economy that would produce growth with equity.
The small proportion of formal sector in advanced industrial countries had very different
effects, covering a much smaller proportion of the population and thus being regressive
instead of progressive (Lindert, Skoufias, and Shapiro, 2005). The neoliberal economic
reforms of the past three decades have had a further regressive impact, due to the
shrinking of the already small proportion of the formal sector employment.
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Scholars also have found very significant differences among countries in Latin
America, in terms of other dimensions. For instance, some countries, such as Chile,
Uruguay, and Costa Rica, have long been recognized as having more effective states and
social policies than other countries in Latin America. Mainwaring and Sailly show
important differences in the institutionalization of party systems (Mainwaring and Sailly,
1995). In some countries, such as Brazil, stronger, more programmatic and disciplined
parties have emerged more recently (Hagopian, 2004). It has been demonstrated on the
basis of elite and mass survey evidence that the degree of programmatic orientation and
coherence of political parties varies greatly between countries and between parties within
the same country (Luna and Zechmeister, 2005). Moreover, Colomer and Escatel show
that citizens in Latin America find the left-right dimension meaningful for the structuring
of politics (Colomer and Escatel, 2004).
The prime policy instruments for shaping the distribution of income are taxes and
social expenditures. In Latin America, the evidence for the distributive impact of social
spending is more mixed and tends to be different for different kinds of expenditures.
Social security spending is regressive (Ferranti, 2004). Social security schemes are
typically tied to the formal sector and exclude the sizable informal sector. Even within
the formal labor force, more highly educated force, more highly educated and more
highly paid employees are the most likely to be covered by social security. Moreover,
because benefits are tied to earnings, the system are highly segmented (IDB, 1998).
In an analysis done by Lee, it is shown that the impact of government spending on
inequalities is dependent on regime type (Lee, 2005). In authoritarian regimes, greater
government spending is associated with greater inequality. In democracies, greater
33

government spending is associated with less inequality. This is very plausible for social
spending in Latin America, where the main alternative to democracy has been right-wing
authoritarian not communism.
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Chapter Two
Informal Networks in China and Latin America
It has been concurred that informal institutions, such as informal networking,
matter for economic performances because they reduce uncertainty and lower the cost of
transactions and productions (North, 1990). North emphasized that informal rules
provide legitimacy to formal rules. A formal institution can achieve positive results if
informal institutions such as customs, traditions, and codes of behavior support it.
Kinship relations provide economic payoff to both Latin American and Chinese social
relations. Lineage networks are a prominent feature of Chinese and Latin American life.
Informal networks exist in every society. These networks play an important role
in maintaining political order and facilitating economic activities, not to mention
providing social cohesion. According to Wang, there are three reasons why informal
networks in Chinese society stand out more. The first is that the degree to which
informal networks contradict and undermine formal institutions is high. Secondly, the
influence of informal networks is unusually strong in every aspect of Chinese life.
Lastly, the level of institutionalization of Chinese networks is very low (Wang, 1997).
The influence of informal networks in Chinese society is extraordinary.
Historically, informal institutions, such as kinship, ancestor worship, and ritual played a
central part in sustaining political order in China (Chang, 1983). While informal politics
exist elsewhere, it rules Chinese politics. The Chinese informal sector has been
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historically dominant, with formal politics often providing no more than a façade
(Dittmer, 1995).
The role of informal networks in economic production and exchange has been
salient throughout Chinese history and in Chinese communities all over the world. In
traditional China, family, kinship, and clans were not only social organizations but
important economic organizations as well. Augmented by the state, these informal
networks formed the basis of petty capitalism, which dominated the Chinese economy for
centuries (Gates, 1996). During the reform era, which is marked by the introduction and
expansion of market mechanisms, informal networks continue to feature prominently in
Chinese economy (Boisost and Child, 1996). Chinese informal networks are less
institutionalized. In Chinese politics, the ties among member of a faction are secretive
and do not have to be hierarchical (Lincoln, 1996).
Transnational relations can be defined as regular interactions across national
boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a
national government or an intergovernmental organization (Rise-Kappen, 1995). A
number of recent case studies of transnational relations demonstrate that domestic
structures mediate, filter, and refract the efforts by transnational actors and alliances to
influence policies in the various issue-areas. Specifically, they find that the more
fragmented the state structure, the less capable should national governments be to prevent
transnational activities (Rise-Kappen, 1995). This leads to the point that the fragmented
nature of China’s political and economic system has been conducive to the
transnationalization of informal networks facilitating foreign investment.
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In addition to the fragmented nature of China’s domestic structure, which makes
room for transnational relations, the tens of millions of ethnic Chinese living outside
China have been active agents of the transnationalization of guanxi networks. Ethnic
Chinese outside of China have a number of advantages over other foreign investors in
resorting to personal networks for investment purposes. First, they have the cultural
advantage, which has two aspects. One aspect of the cultural advantage is distinctively
Chinese. It refers to their understanding of the Chinese language and the art of personal
relationships in a culturally Chinese context. Wherever they live, whether in Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Southeast Asia, most ethnic Chinese know at least one dialect. The
economic success of overseas Chinese in recent years has in large part resulted from the
informal networks they have created (Hamilton, 1996). These networks based on family
kinship, and other types of common bonds provide an efficient way for Chinese business
people to obtain information, raise capital, reduce labor cost, and enforce contracts
(Wang, 1997).
The other aspect of the cultural advantage, which is often neglected is not
uniquely Chinese. It refers to the practical knowledge of operating in developing
countries where the institutional environment is similar to one in China. Ethnic Chinese
have concrete human connection in China. Since ethnic Chinese have ancestral homes
and roots in China, they can invoke these ties as the basis of familiarity and close
relationships. Moreover, many Chinese living elsewhere in the world still have relatives
and friends in China, with whom they can easily reconnect and develop strong personal
ties (Liu, 1998).

37

In China kinship networks function to protect private property rights and facilitate
the growth of private entrepreneurship in China before formal property rights laws
became effective. Max Weber observed that clan organization was preserved completely
in China (Weber, 1951). He observed that this clan organization was the most important
actor in the Chinese countryside, which ran schools, owned land and extended cheap
credit to its members (Weber, 1989).
This was transformed by the Communist revolution. The Communist Party made
assaults on the lineage organizations. It confiscated clan communal land and injected the
ideology of class consciousness and class struggle to diffuse clan identity (Wang, 1991).
The economic foundation and organizational structure of the lineage system were
replaced with collective farms and grassroots administration from 1949-1979. However,
the lineage culture became vibrant again during the market reform era.
Despite changes, such as the shift from the extended to the nuclear family and the
phasing out of prearranged marriages, some features of Chinese familism persist (Whyte,
1995). These features include loyalty to the larger kin groups and sacrifice of personal
interests for the sake of the family. The Chinese society is organized by guanxi circles,
extending from the family, to relatives and friends.
Even though it is no longer considered a corporate actor, lineage remains the
locus of collective action and normative control in contemporary China (Bian and Ang,
1997). Those structural features are equal to social capital benefits. Strong ties provide
the bond obligations, cultural identity generalizes bilateral bonds and obligations into
group loyalty, and leadership and density help to mobilize resources into collective action
and normative control.
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In a study done by Yusheng Peng, he concluded that kin solidarity and kin trust
played an important role in protecting the property rights of private entrepreneurs and
reducing transaction costs during the early stages of market reform, when formal property
rights laws were ineffective and market institutions undeveloped. Data was taken from
366 villages in 1994 to determine that kinship networks in Chinese villages have large
positive effects on the development of private enterprises and insignificant effects on the
development of collective enterprises (Peng, 2001).
Rural industry has been the most dynamic sector in China over the past two
decades and has played a crucial role in China’s successful transition from a planned
economy to a market economy. While China’s gross domestic product (GDP)
maintained an annual growth rate of 9.5% from 1978-1997, rural industry output
achieved an annual rate of 27% during the same period (China State Statistical Bureau,
1998).
As China moves away from a centrally planned economy, Chinese managers are
still aware that with strong lineage networks, family businesses have a better chance to
prevail (Hill, 2007). In China, familism and kinship loyalty are the social roots of
economic development. Kinship solidarity refers to the norm of commitment to
collective interests and goals of the lineage group. Lineage remains the focus of
collective action and normative control in contemporary China. Strong ties provide the
bonds and obligations; cultural identity generalizes bilateral bonds and obligations into
group loyalty, and density help to mobilize resources into collective action.
Informal integration is very strong in East Asia, especially in China, compared to
Latin America. China’s economy is characterized by the lack of coherent business laws
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and strong governmental contrast over limited resources (Marshall, 2006). Developing
close relationships is a necessary step to succeed in China. By developing personal
relationships, firms can enhance their marketing effectiveness and efficiency. The
Chinese use the guanxi networks, which are connections, accepted as a matter of course
in China (Wesdenbaum & Hughes, 1996). In China, guanxi networks fulfill a significant
function in a society that lacks a legitimate legal system. As Tsui & Farh explain it, a
guanxi is the interpersonal relationships based on specific criteria or ties (Tsui & Farh,
1997). A guanxi is a personalized and close business relationship that is often considered
a necessary condition to start a new business in China. Davies better defines guanxi as a
set of personal connections that secures resources or advantages when doing business or
in the course of social life (Davies, 1995). Guanxi is an enormous force supporting the
way in which the Chinese conduct themselves and do business.
Guanxi makes up for the weak legal system in China. People establish and
maintain guanxi through informal interactions. Consequently, people tend to engage in
guanxi activities privately, outside the official domain (Redding, 1991).
Guanxi is a personal relationship and a framework in which people relate to one
another as individuals rather than role occupants. It takes personal interactions and
sentiment to initiate and maintain guanxi (King, 1991). In the economic realm, this
means that transactions depend critically on personal rather than organization trust and
relationship.
It is also a reciprocal relationship through which people exchange favors. The
favors exchanged range from scarce resources necessary in daily life to professional
opportunities and political support. The exchange does not have to be immediate or
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direct; indeed the return of a favor is structurally uncertain (Yang, 1994). But, guanxi
generally involves repayment of a favor in one way or another.
Trust is an important foundation of guanxi. Since guanxi is an informal
relationship of reciprocity, it cannot rely on formal institutions guarantee of enforcement.
Parties of a guanxi relationship can only rely on their confidence in each other’s desire
and capabilities to fulfill their respective obligations. According to Wang, Guanxi makes
up for the weak legal system in China in two ways (Wang, 1997). First, it has been used
to complement law, classifying legal ambiguity and providing access to legal
mechanisms of contract enforcement. Secondly, it has been used to secure business
opportunities with high profit potential, compensating for the high risks of investing in
China.
Personal connections are impacted by the Chinese culture in a number of ways.
The Confucian legacy is very central to personal connections. In Confucianism the
individual is perceived as a relational being, in other words, it is the focus of how well an
individual gets along with another. Relationships among strangers are also very
important. It is expected that the relationship persists and that people know that other
members of the network will be making judgments on their behavior. In this relationship,
Confucian principles require the participants to do favors for each other, help those in
need, and reciprocate favors received.
As I mentioned above, the Chinese culture is based on relationships. Although
the guanxi is based on networking, it is not to be mistaken as “palanca” or connections as
they call it in Latin America. It is wrong to make the assumption that guanxi is the
theory who you know matters more than what you know. Bell writes that the guanxi
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network has a valuation that surpasses connections. So ultimately, not everyone pertains
to a network within which guanxi operates (Bell, 2000).
Because of the Open-door policy, the majority of foreign capital coming into
China is provided by overseas Chinese, foreign firms and joint ventures. The ethnic
Chinese business networks are beneficial because information, capital and other
resources are easily transferred across national borders. Informal networks, like that of
the ECBN’s also makes it easier for Chinese businesses to obtain valuable information
necessary for their business activities. The use of networks is very important for the
future development of the economy.
The ECBN is a type of informal integration that promotes regional integration in
the absence of a free trade agreement. It is very important that attention be placed on the
impact of informal factors that are playing a major role in the Chinese economy.
The center of the ECBN’s are concentrated along kinship and lineage. In the
Chinese culture, the family is the primary basis. These EBN’s have their origins in
Confucianism, which places a great deal of emphasis on human relations. Trust is the
major basis for ties among the ethnic Chinese. The basic conditions to build these ties
are the common culture and norms. Other common bases for good ties among the
Chinese include kinship coming from the same region and speaking the same language
(Peng, 233). For the business networks to function there has to be mutual trust among
individuals and firms and Chinese rely on these more than legal contracts. The advantage
of having a strong ECBN is that all the capital made by Overseas Chinese goes straight to
China to establish new production bases.
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In Asia, China has the longest history and also the strongest influence on social
and economic developments because a relatively high proportion of the Asian population
is of Chinese ancestry. For many years, these people have been called “overseas
Chinese”, reputed for their aggressive, vibrant and influential roles in Asia-Pacific
profiles. Distinctive characteristics include being hard-working, pioneering, progressive
and acquisitive.
The overseas Chinese as a group keep their cultural identities and they also
develop their businesses along family lines. A major difference between overseas
Chinese and overseas Latin Americans is that the Chinese do not have any formal
organization that coordinates their activities. The overseas Chinese do not belong to any
political unity, as opposed to overseas Latin Americans who strive to develop into a
political community (Duckett, 2001). Latin America has always been easily influenced
by Western ways. Although Latin America still has a reliance on family lineage, as the
Chinese do, formal economic integration is dominating that region. Formal integration
refers to economic integration through regional institutions or comprehensive free trade
agreements, such as the EU and NAFTA. In contrast, informal integration refers to
integration through non-institutional means based on factors such as ethnic ties and
industrial linkages. It is through this informal integration the reason why the Chinese
economy is more developed.
The operation of the ECBN’s is informal and its commercial power is very strong.
The networks make up the small scale of the overseas Chinese economy relative to the
huge Western firms. The most important reason for the overseas Chinese capital to go
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straight to China is to establish new production bases. They take advantage of the cheap
labor for their labor-intensive manufacturing firms.
There are many advantages that come with ethnic business networks. Ethnic
Chinese are skillful in dealing with the governments in various countries and Chinese
businessmen are well-known for having close ties with various governments at all levels.
In China’s case, the ethnic Chinese have a far better understanding of the special
characteristics of Chinese society that is taken into consideration when conducting
business in China.
As I mentioned earlier, trust is very essential in Chinese economy. The distrust
that Chinese hold towards outsiders is reflected in their preference for highly centralized
control of their firms. Only people who are known very well and trusted within a
Chinese-owned company are invited to be shareholders and directors in the firm. It is the
informal, personal ties rather than that between incumbents of office that is more
important. For the Chinese, emotional trust is more important than cognitive trust, and is
based on sentiment-based ties between individuals, which may also be extended to others
through the relationship network (Duckett, 2001).
Chinese businessmen believe that interpersonal trust minimizes fraud to ensure
certainty and order. They maintain that by having guanxi, formal legal sanctions are not
necessary to induce performance exchange. This can be settled informally with guanxi.
Xinyong is also very important in Chinese business networks. Xinyong refers to
the integrity, credibility, trustworthiness, or the reputation and character of a person. The
initial trust is more of a presumption of trust of a social category. There is a higher
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presumption of trust in relatives than in non-kin. However, after several business
dealings, a non-kin can acquire Xinyong through the quality of his work.
Chinese business practices emphasize personal trust. Xinyongs’ underlying
principals grants those who apply to it a higher sense of moral superiority because it is
based upon the honesty and integrity of individuals. Since the use of verbal agreement is
dependent on Xinyong, the non-use of written contracts symbolizes the extent of mutual
trust between them. Sometimes this is compromised. An example of this is in dealing
with a new client. For someone new, there may be written contracts involved. As time
passes and the new client is known better, there are no written contracts.
A possible source of challenge to the informal business network comes from the
use of the modern state. For example, stress from credentialism and the emphasis on the
objectiveness of science and technology may challenge the endurance of personalism.
Mandatory requirements regarding formalized transactions may be demanded by the state
(Marshall, 2007). However, overtime, these demands will create new standards as to
what is appropriate and necessary.
China is regarded as a country in which economic relations are strongly
dependent on trust, while, at the same time, trust is difficult to build there. Chinese
culture is often noted for its particularism and insistence on building up trust through
cultivating personal relationships into which it is difficult for foreigners to enter (Hickson
and Pugh, 2001). Some identify the root cause of the issue in China as the
underdevelopment of its institutions compared to most other industrial countries, which
permits corruption. This explains why the Chinese do not extend trust easily outside their
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familiar social circles and why foreigners find it hard to trust the Chinese on general
principals.
In China, private entrepreneurs set up and run non-farm operations such as single
households or multiple households in partnerships, including both self-employed
individuals and owners of private enterprises (Marshall, 2007). Because legal
enforcement of private property rights has been ineffective, private entrepreneurs depend
on informal norms for security. Chinese peasants do understand the difference between
collective vs. private property. However, moral justice can be manipulated and is pale
without the support of a social circle in solidarity.
Enforceable trust reduces costs in social exchanges such as interpersonal loans
and pooling of funds. In China’s reform process, private entrepreneurs have found it very
hard to obtain bank loans due to political discrimination. Thus, informal financial
institutions similar to rotary credit associations have been important channels for
providing start-up capital or emergency cash for small-scale private businesses (Tsai,
2002).
Studies have shown that the Overseas Chinese have created informal associations
to which co ethnic businesspeople from both the host countries and the mother country
have access. These networks facilitate trade across polities by building trust when
contract enforcement is weak to nonexistent. The work of Greif has established the idea
that co-ethnic networks can promote international trade by providing community
enforcement of sanctions that deter violations of contracts in a weak international legal
environment (Greif, 1989; 1993).
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If a business owner violates an agreement then he is blacklisted. For overseas
Chinese, this is worse than being sued, because the Chinese networks will stay away from
doing business with the guilty party (Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996).
While trying to cope with local changes influenced by Western legal forms and
concepts, China is enjoying rapidly increasing foreign investment. Again, I place
emphasis on the guanxi as it provides one of the most dramatic examples of an
entrenched cultural norm under pressure from international business trends.
During the past two decades, China has become a major player in world trade and
has attracted substantial foreign investment (Knight and Song, 2001). With China’s
cautious integration into the world economy, important changes have taken place in the
domestic business environment. These changes include increased privatization of
business firms, a movement toward more emphasis on the rule of law, changes in forms
of business operation, and increased competition (Liang, 2002).
I felt it important to demonstrate that there are some scholars who believe that
China is moving away from its established traditions. The significance of this is to show
how necessary a component guanxi is to the Chinese society. As Eakeley put it, “China is
showing an interest in the rule of law” (Eakeley, 1997). Although there is a growing
interest in law, there are still problems of federalism and administration and corruption
plague (Nikkel, 1995). When legal remedies are not effective enough, shareholders rely
on mediation or guanxi, which is the most common route.
There are scholars who disagree on the debate of whether China is moving toward
a Westernized emphasis on the rule of law. Guthrie believes shifts in the economy have
led China to redesign the legal system in a way that it would favor efficiency and produce
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disincentives for guanxi-based transactions (Guthrie, 1998). He goes on to explain how
increases in the monitoring of industrial organizations decrease the reliance on guanxi.
Others, such as Garten, disagree arguing that the structure of China’s government will not
be as important to business as the officials who are in charge (Garten, 1998). Besides
Garten, there are others who agree that guanxi will gain importance in international
transactions because it provides a more effective means of conveying trust than formal
legal contracts (Lovett, 1999).
Privately-owned firms continue to emerge, along with hybrid forms in which a
governmental entity owns the majority of the shares and private investors own an interest.
The Chinese government encourages privatization as a means of increasing efficient
decision-making and also tapping the flexibility of global capital markets. Although
privatization encountered difficulties in the late 1990s, according to Dunfee and Warren,
it is expected to accelerate especially when China is finally admitted to the World Trade
Organization (Dunfee and Warren, 2001).
In an attempt to sustain economic growth, China offers increasingly more
attractive opportunities for foreign investment. These opportunities coincide with major
changes in the legal and political environment such as the legalization of wholly foreignowned enterprises. Such ownership opportunities continue to attract foreign investors
who do not want to bother with local businesses. Tung and Worm’s research on
European firms conducting business in China confirm the assertion that foreign investors
desire a sole ownership in their Chinese business (Tung & Worm, 1997). Their research
explains how these managerial preferences stem from the fact that they want to attempt to
lessen the influence of the large cultural distance between Europe and China.
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The growth of wholly-owned foreign enterprises threatens to disrupt traditional
Chinese practices the most, despite the fact that any type of foreign investment poses a
threat to the Chinese business culture. Most importantly, these foreign-owned
organizations may present competitive forces that conflict with guanxi traditions and
thereby impact the effectiveness of an organization that relies heavily on guanxi.
Dunfee and Warren explain the current debate of guanxi. They address
managerial perceptions of guanxi, guanxi ownership, and business uses of guanxi. They
indicate that many argue that guanxi is deeply tied to the Confucian heritage of the
Chinese people and entrenched in the Chinese way of life (Yeung and Tung, 1996). If
guanxi is deeply rooted in traditional Chinese culture, then economic forces alone should
not be sufficient to bring about major changes in the practice. If guanxi is more
artifactual, then it may change quickly in the face of evolving background institutions and
business conditions.
To know how current Chinese view guanxi, Guthrie did a survey of Chinese
managers. In that survey he found that some view guanxi as increasing in importance
while others believe that it is of less importance in the emerging Chinese legal
framework. Guthrie summarized the view as stating that guanxi is diminishing in
importance due to both increasing competition and legalism. Those managers in higher
institutions already have access to the bureaucrats who facilitate business transactions
and therefore do not need to rely on guanxi as much as those managers in lower
institutions (Guthrie, 1998).
Dunfee and Warren do believe that there is an impact of guanxi on economic
performance. There are certain macro considerations supporting the claim that the
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impact of guanxi is positive (Dunfee and Warren, 1999). Guanxi serves as a means for
signaling trust and credibility in a society in which such characteristics are not supported
by incentives embedded in strong background institutions (Lovett, 1999). It also
constitutes an informal network allowing the bypassing of the inefficiencies inherent in a
communist bureaucracy. In this sense, guanxi is seen as a substitute for the rule of law.
Xin and Pearce reported that private managers were more likely to rely on guanxi as a
defensive measure (Xin & Pearce, 1996). “Emphasis on personal power promotes the
practice of guanxi, since an individual defines what is permissible in a given context at a
particular time” (Yeung and Tung, 1996).
The Chinese businessmen who have legitimate claims over resources are
governed by the moral precepts of rightfulness, fairness, and equitability. The key
question is to what extent moral justice is enforceable. Without the backing of legal
sanctioning, the effectiveness of informal property rights depends crucially on the
sanctioning capacity of social networks. The thrust of my argument is that kin solidarity
and kin trust help to enforce the informal norms of property rights. For the Chinese
businessmen, kinship networks help protect them from predatory cadres, and thus reduce
the uncertainty and high transaction costs associated with insecure property rights and
fledging markets.
Ultimately, upon reviewing China’s continued success over Latin America, it is
inevitable to attribute the overseas Chinese economic success in China to guanxi and
kinship. As noted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, overseas
Chinese receive better returns on their investments in China because they rely on family
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members and friends who already possess guanxi to assist in business establishments
(1997).
The importance of guanxi in business dealings is accepted as virtually a truism in
certain areas of Asia. Many have argued that understanding and practicing guanxi is
essential for successful market entry and sustained success in China.
As already described, guanxi is used to better facilitate efficient exchange. The
ability to develop trust to create tightly linked connections between business parties is
seen as a comparative advantage for firms. Gift-giving and entertainment used as a
foundation for future business relationships are common in many cultures. This is very
true in the United States where a large industry supports business entertaining. These
practices are based on the idea that humans are social creatures and that social
relationships underpin many other types of interactions. A different use of guanxi is to
apply it to overriding government rules and regulations. It may be the equivalent to
coarse public sector bribery where payments are made to avoid environmental or safety
regulations. Another reason why guanxi is an important component to the Chinese
economy is because it is used as a facilitator of business transactions in China.
The need for a networked society is rooted in the insecurity that emerged in a
close-to-subsistence level society and lack of trust in the forces of modernization.
Despite the fact that China’s communist history of nationalist production has meant that
people in China have had a different experience of business than people in the Chinese
diaspora, it is regarded that the practice of networking is comparable given the shared
Confucian history of ethnic Chinese throughout the world.
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Luo suggests that the reason why guanxi differs from inter-firm networking in
Latin America is that it is ubiquitous in playing a fundamental role in daily life (Luo,
2000). Latin American’s fight for rights and the Chinese curry favor through guanxi ties.
The Chinese focus on relationships created over long periods of time that are built on
frequent exchanges. In China, interactions with others are viewed as part of a whole
relationship, as opposed to the West, where business and social positions are separate.

Overseas Chinese
Since Chinese civilization reaches back for more than four thousand years, the
Chinese had the opportunity to migrate to all areas of the world. The overseas Chinese
are widely distributed around the world and live in almost every country. Finally, the
overseas Chinese have had important social, economic and cultural influences in many of
their host countries; moreover, they have also made important contribution to their home
country of China.
When referring to overseas Chinese, I used the definition employed by others: all
Chinese living abroad (outside of mainland China and Taiwan). This definition includes
all persons with any Chinese ancestry.
The influence of the culture of overseas Chinese on business is very well
recognized. Firms owned by Overseas Chinese often belong to loosely interconnected
networks of firms that prefer to conduct business with one another. Confucian traditions,
such as the primacy of relationships influence decision making in firms in ethnic Chinese
communities. There is widespread acceptance that the shared culture of overseas Chinese
produces some common behaviors that differ from the West.
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As a group, Overseas Chinese businesses are a major economic force around East
Asia. Chinese-owned businesses dominate industries anywhere from food production to
property developments. In 1997, the estimated economic output by the Overseas Chinese
was about U.S. $500 billion (Zutshi, 1997).
The overseas Chinese maintain a culture that is not found in the West. Hofstede
and Bond grouped these cultural characteristics under ‘Confucian dynamism.’ (Hofstede
& Bond, 1988). Key differences include the link of the family to the business, the role of
guanxi in doing business, and the financing of the firm.
In the Latin American society, the role of the family diminishes as the firms grow.
As a small family-owned business grows larger, they raise money in the public equity
market. Even if the family remains a principal shareholder, the financial markets require
that the firm be managed in such a manner that is consistent with other public firms. The
Overseas Chinese firms function as family businesses whether or not the firms are traded
publicly.
Pressure from equity markets in Asia is less than that in the West. This is so
because the levels of family ownership limit the degree of outside influence over poorly
performing firms. This allows the top management to govern the firm with less input
from the outside. The primacy of the family in Overseas Chinese firms is further insured
by the strong family control over key aspects of the firm even if it is traded publicly.
There is a recognized tendency for thrift in the Chinese culture. This tendency
has developed as a means to deal with the frequent political and social turmoil that has
negatively impacted various Chinese communities around East Asia. One consequence
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of this is that Overseas Chinese firms rely more heavily on numerous lines of credit and
short-term loans than similar firms in Latin America (Liu, 1998).
Guanxi is one of the pillars that differentiate firms in ethnic Chinese communities
(FECCs) from Latin American businesses. These networks initially arose in response to
the absence of strong legal traditions. Without legal support, the relationships and
connections provided a means to enforce, or sanction violators of contracts (Peng and
Luo, 2000).
Another differentiation between FECCs and Latin America is the central role of
the owner-manager. In Chinese culture, the head of the family is the father and this
individual is given respect. The owner of an FECC holds the position of Board Chair and
has control of the firm and its decisions. In Latin America, an owner-manager can play a
similar role in closely held family-owned firms; however, in FECCs, this role is common
to organizations of all sizes. Therefore, in FECCs this owner-manager would hold the
title of Chairman of the Board and will make all major decisions of the firm with little
supervision from the outside.
In Chinese culture, there is a tendency not to discuss negatives such as illness
because it is believed to bring bad luck. This also holds true in business not only due to
the potential for bad luck but also because it may cause a loss of face or respect among
peers of the business person.
Chinese family businesses (CFBs) use an informal and unstructured approach to
FDI. They tend to send family members overseas to be in charge of key management
positions. According to Kao, many of the CFBs ownership and managerial control are
concentrated with in a single family Kao, 1993). Some CFBs have become MNCs.
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Competition has increasingly spread across national borders because of rapidly merging
world markets.
According to a study done by E.W.K Tsang, it was found that CFBs and nonCFBs have different approaches to attracting FDI. He did this study by observing 10
Singapore companies (Tsang, 1998). At the beginning stage of evaluating an FDI
project, CFBs tend to have a less formal and structured way of collecting information and
conducting analysis than non-CFBs. The negotiating team of a CFB consists of the
boss/head of family and his immediate family. Non-CFBs is often larger and consists of
various functional managers. CFBs tend to assign family members to be in charge of key
positions and they rely heavily on their boss’ visits to these headquarters and overseas
operations.
Strategic experience is maintained within the family of a CFB because of its
highly centralized mangement control and strategic decision-making. Some CFBs have
become sprawling MNCs. Examples include the Hutchison Whampoa of Hong Kong
and the Salim Group of Indonesia. To survive competition by foreign competitors a
company should leverage its strength overseas (Peng, 2000).
In a CFB, managerial ideology is shaped by Chinese cultural values such as clear
hierarchy, reciprocal vertical obligation, and benevolent autocracy. The internal system
of coordination and control is highly personal. Tight control is exerted on financial and
production management. In dealing with the external environment, CFBs make use of
extensive networking and relational contracting. These networking activities also enable
a CFB to transcend its own limitation of scale through obtaining access to resources
owned by other network members (Powell, 1990). There are three main features of CFBs
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that distinguish them from other family firms. The first two are Chinese managerial
ideology and extensive networking behavior. The third feature is the way of business
succession.
Out of the 10 companies that were studied in Singapore, only three are CFBs.
Singapore is a latecomer to the China investment arena. They had three main objectives
to investing in China. Firstly, the huge domestic market attracted them. Secondly, they
wanted to establish a business presence and gain strategic positions. The third motive
was to take advantage of the lower labor cost in China.
When a foreign investor sets up an operation in China, it has to negotiate with the
government bodies concerned. There are instances where Chinese negotiators may use
tactics that catch their Western counterparts off guard. This is why foreign investors
need to send their skillful negotiators to China in order to achieve good bargains.

Networking in Latin America
As in China, the family is of fundamental importance throughout Latin America.
Family ties are the basis of identity and orientation to the greater society and political
system (Vanden and Provost, 2006). However, Latin America is quickly becoming more
urbanized and as urbanization takes place, financial pressures have begun to reduce
family size, but not family unit. In Latin America it is the male that has a great deal of
power. Effective political action is associated with the strong ruling style that most Latin
American patriarchs display. It is traditionally expected that the Latin American
politician exhibit characteristics identified with the strong dominant male, otherwise
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known as machismo. Machismo is very much incorporated into the Latin American
culture.
In Latin America, classism and elitism exists and mobility and entrance to social
circles or employment opportunities are still often defined by who one is and the circle in
which one’s family travels than by one’s accomplishments and abilities. However, as
Latin America becomes more urban and educated, the Latin American society will
continue to change, and many of the old barriers will be challenged.
From a historical and legal perspective, the family in Latin America is represented
consistently as the fundamental unit of society, and as an institution that is essentially
patriarchal, based on a system of monogamous marriage, and focused on reproduction.
This vision is retained from the 16th and 20th century in spite of the remarkable diversity
in family and household forms that existed in Latin America over time. The family as
constructed through laws can be seen as the codification of an elite world vision,
concerned with the legality of family ties, with the legal definition of marital and paternal
power, the legitimacy of offspring, and the regulation of family wealth.
The family as an institution in Latin America has always been vital. Children in
Latin America continue to utilize kinship and family relations in creative and adaptive
ways even as they interact ever more strongly with the globalized economy.
Globalization in Latin America also includes neoliberalism and free trade, which as
exacerbated an already unequal distribution of income. One important characteristic of
that distribution is that kinship relations have increasingly become segregated within
particular socio-economic groups, as was the case historically until the 20th century
(Bulmer-Thomas, 2003).
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Oscar Lewis was one of the first to observe that aggregate data concealed the
importance of the family as a building unit between the individual and society (Lewis,
1950). Charles Wagley similarly concluded that “there is a growing body of evidence
that kinship relations and awareness of kinship need not disappear with industrialization
and urbanization” (Wagley, 1964). There is every reason to believe that kinship will
continue to play an important role in ordering social relations.
Antonio Gramsci’s idea of “contradictory consciousness” can be easily applied to
the attitudes of working-class Mexicans to changes in gender relations and family
structure in Mexico. Gramsci defines this as “those who simultaneously hold uncritically
to ideas and practices inherited from the past while they also develop new ways of
thinking based on the practical transformations of the real world in which they are
constantly engaged” (Gramsci, 1971). This is a good description of how much most
Latin America adheres to traditional ideas about the family, even as they are forced by
circumstances to adapt family structure and roles to increasingly difficult economic
circumstances and changing ideologies of the family. This, however, does not mean that
to maintain kinship and family relations along with committing to the family has
evaporated.
In Latin America, both political and economic powers reinforce each other. One
has to understand the politics of the region to understand the economy in Latin America.
It has been seen that the Latin American governance is breaking down, as new
movements strive to challenge traditional political leadership, traditional political
institutions are losing legitimacy. Recently, there has been a growing discontent with the
return of democracy. Many people feel that they have been left economically
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marginalized by the globalization process. It is acknowledged that the recent growth of
democratic political forms and economic restructuring have done very little to remove
social inequalities.
Neo-liberalism and the globalization process have had a considerable affect on the
Latin American economies. There was a reduction of inflation in most of Latin America,
including Brazil and Argentina. There was also economic growth in the early and mid1990’s. Some of the wealthiest people in the world are generated from Mexico. This
took place in the 1980’s, when the larger economic groups were temporarily weakened
by the economic crisis and the 1982 bank nationalization (Vanden, Prevost, 2006). As a
result, these large economic groups succeeded in reconstituting themselves with
significant help from the government. New groups formed and both old and new
benefited from the reprivatization of the banks.
Despite this success, there is still the inequitable distribution of wealth and
income. The IMF conditionality and austerity measures that have become part of
structural adjustments have crated a burden on the poor, and many in the middle class
(Thomson, 2007). Inequality and continued marginality for the masses have spawned
major leftist parties that have won many local and congressional elections. A growing
number of workers have been forced to go into the informal sector to survive. According
to the ILO, the informal sector arose as a response to the inability of the modern sector to
provide sufficient jobs (Franko, 2007). Low productivity in the informal sector drags the
rest of the economy down. On the other hand, productivity levels in the formal sector
have been advancing. Though there is a rising trend In the informal sector, Chile is the
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exception. This is due to the fact that there has been a rapid growth in the economy and
other factors such as the introduction of private retirement accounts.
Mexico’s performance is an example of the cost and benefits of globalization.
Mexico was quick to liberalize its current and capital accounts and to integrate its
economy into the North American economy. When the United States economy
performed well, Mexico benefited. Growth was export-led. The economy became less
dependent on oil and manufactured exports became less dependent on the assembly
industry. However, Mexico went into recession as soon as the United States economy
slowed down.
The large size of these family owned businesses presents a two-fold dilemma. On
the one hand, their magnitude allows for economies of scale that increase their productive
capacity, efficiency, and immunity to the economic hazards that characterize the Latin
American environment. On the other hand, size augments their vulnerability to political
controls and interventions.
The structure of second and third generation of these businesses is also affected in
important ways by entrepreneurial ventures of individual family members. In economies
in which there are only limited investment opportunities, individuals create ventures in
order to put their money to work. While owned by a single-family member, these
ventures often become dependent on the larger family business as a source of clients and
customers (WEF, 2007). For example, a second-generation president of a large banking
group started a private travel agency to provide travel arrangements for the executives in
the family businesses. The executives felt obliged to use the agency regardless of
whether or not it offered the best services in the market. When several members of a
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given family replicate this kind of activity, it becomes a form of moonlighting that can
create conflicts of interest and dilute the overall focus and structure of the enterprise.
As Woehrer puts it, loyalty to the family is paramount (Woehrer, 1988). There is
enmeshment in these families because of the constant presence of a hostile environment
in which there are vast differences between rich and poor. Wealth, high visibility,
stature, and influence make these families the targets of terrorism and crime. The
Chinese, on the other hand have these types of corruptions, but again, due the guanxibased networks, the corruption is not much of a factor affecting its economy.
The impact of the Latin American environment on the inner working of the
leading family enterprises can be examined by tracing the interaction between the
economic, political, and sociocultural forces in the environment and the three basic
domains: family, business, and ownership. These domains constitute the family business
systems as identified by Davis & Tagiuri (1986).
Rapid growth also raises a number of ethical dilemmas that are unique to these
societies. The Latin American economies are covered with micro enterprises providing
goods and services of every variety. With the entry of a commercial giant into a given
sector of the economy, the existence of small ventures is threatened. In developed
economies with multiple resources and options, the high turnover of smaller businesses
rarely threatens the total loss of livelihood and sustenance. In Latin America, the leading
families vary significantly in their social values and political orientation. Therefore,
families differ in the extent to which they are willing to handle the dilemma posed by
unintended harm that may result from the growth of their business.
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Family identity is powerful in Latin American societies as it is in China. In
addition, family identity is inseparable from business identity for every family member
(Tapia, 2004). In many families, selling a share in the company tends to augment the
number of family shareholders who retain their stock ownership primarily for family
rather than for economic reasons. This limits the effectiveness of attempts to consolidate
the holding company stock of many family businesses (Hefferman, 2005).
However, predominantly speaking in Latin America, the guanxi component that
the Chinese have is missing. Family businesses face the dilemma of long-term survival
by not only overcoming difficulties common to all economic activities, but also conflicts
specifically arising from their family-business nature (Carlock and Ward, 2001). Often,
family welfare and needs take priority with no consideration for the firm’s need for future
growth. When the business is given priority, this usually occurs to the detriment of
family communication.
Research findings by Esteban Brenes and Kryssa Madrigal suggest that survival
of generational transition or the family as a whole, require defining guidelines to
anticipate conflict. These research findings indicated that family structure and
agreements on issues concerning succession and business control all attempt to achieve
family-business balance. However, all efforts targeted family preservation. According to
Brenes and Madrigal, many families in Latin America rely on external members as a way
to gaining objectiveness and to avoiding conflict. Non-family members have proven
important for family business development and communication.
In Latin American family businesses, family culture is strong. The role of the
family in these societies is central to every facet of daily life. Family values, attitudes,
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and behaviors are imported into the firm in a direct and forceful way, demanding loyalty
and commitment from family and non-family members alike. Non-family employees are
often treated like adopted members of the family. Security, caring, and inclusion are
offered in exchange for performance and allegiance. Paternalism, which is the dominant
management model, is the approach to the management of people that is protective and
benevolent but also patronizing. Outsiders often misread the importance of paternalism.
There are a number of important factors that contribute to the survival and
proliferation of these organizations in Latin societies, but again, the Latin American
society lacks the strong hold that China has. One reason is the lack of competition in
Latin economies, coupled with the fact that many commercial niches are protected from
foreign companies (Brenes and Madrigal, 2003). Another reason is that the social
structure of Latin societies also creates a climate in which members of the upper circles
often support each other’s commercial activities (Fernandez-Kelly, 2006).
In Latin America, popular capitalism exists and is created by the activities
generally characterized as informal. These informal activities, illegal but not criminal,
take place in the absence of legal protection and guarantees. For example, the street
vendor goals in Latin America are licit but must use illicit means non-compliant with
legal regulations, non-compliant with labor laws, and non-payment of taxes because there
are no other alternatives. The street vendor cannot be incorporated in the formal economy
because the formal economy imposes a heavy cost on Latin American societies as to
make it impossible for people and entrepreneurs with minimal income to enter it.
Informality is a situation whereby people want to work legally, but cannot.
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In Latin America, informal commerce and public transportation services are
public and visible. There are two kinds of informal industrialists in this region. One is
the formal industrialist who informalizes part of the production as a result of the high cost
of regulation of taxes. Even though he may conceal part of his production, he belongs to
the community of established industrialists. In many cases the high cost of legality in
Latin America has forced him to move part of his production to the informal sector.
Therefore, he has to abandon the formal sector, or hide totally or partially in the informal
sector. That occurs every time inflation rises, which in turn, raises taxes. The other kind
of informal industrialists is made up of artisans and fully informal industrialists, who are
employed illegally in the manufacturing sector.
The origin of informality can be found in the inefficiency of the law. Activities
are informal because of the cost of legality. In Latin America, the cost of the law is very
high. Latin Americans measure the cost of the law when the cost of complying with it is
greater than its benefits. People comply with the law when it is convenient. When it is
not, they do not comply with it.
From the law being so costly it distorts the market and excludes from it the leastfavored sectors of the population. There is informality in Latin America because people
cannot work otherwise, given their small incomes. They cannot comply with the law,
cannot pay taxes, and cannot have access to formally built houses because they cannot
afford it. In Latin America, there is a kind of capitalism where private property is not a
right but a privilege and competition does not exist. The state takes it upon itself to
create legal obstacles to market competition. This is where the difference between China
and Latin America can also be noticed. Informal networks in China exist to motivate
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economic development as a whole. In Latin America, informality is seen more as a
means of survival (Thomson, 2007).
In Latin America, the 1990’s were a time of significant economic and political
changes that altered the social landscape of the region, and promised to reduce the
poverty that still afflicts the great majority of the population. It was the beginning of the
privatization of state enterprises and the opening of the economy to foreign goods and
investment in countries where historically the government played a key role as promoter
of development.
Today, however, the situation could not be any worse, as evidence by the
economic downturn that afflicts the region. Argentina has exemplified the crisis, but it is
by no means the only case: Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia and most nations of
Central America also find themselves in a very delicate situation.
It is necessary to consider the impact of two cultural constructs on the success of
any type of economic reform in Latin America: 1) corruption and the ensuing lack of
trust in social institutions, and 2) highly inadequate support for the creation of small
businesses. According to Thomas Friedman, the ability of an economy to withstand
globalization depends on the quality of its legal system, financial system and economic
management (Friedman, 2000). In Latin America, corruption has been a major problem,
and in the context of a severe crisis, lack of confidence in public institutions can become
a barrier to necessary reforms.
Networks of reciprocal help abound in poor neighborhoods in Latin America.
Enzo Mingione coined the term popular economy by which he means the combination of
activities undertakes for direct subsistence and for low monetary income (Mingione,
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1991). In small towns throughout Latin America, these activities include raising animals,
operating food stalls, undertaking self-help repairs and buildings, and industrial homeworking in subcontracting chains. These activities have always been made possible by
family and neighborhood networks to coagulate into a poor but socially protected way of
life. Larissa Lomnitz showed in her study of a Mexican shantytown that social networks
based on residence and kinship function as a surrogate system of social security for
individual survival among the residents (Lomnitz, 1988). Proximate networks of
reciprocity with neighbors and kins are well-studied elements in understanding how
individuals confront the challenge of survival and the kinds of relations they establish in
the process (Friedman, 2000). Reciprocal favors abound in the slum economies much as
they do in other poor neighborhoods across the America’s. But with the escalation of
unemployment and underemployment and the generalized reduction of income, these
networks are being progressively emptied of their resources. The avenues that formerly
linked the slum economy to outside wage work are now being disrupted. When rejection
from the labor market ceases to be temporary and income reduction affects every job that
the unskilled residents of the poor neighborhoods can obtain, the social economy of the
slum loses its traditional function as a buffer that helps cushion the impacts of economic
hardship.
To fully understand the logic of clientelist interaction, one must not only focus on
the objective meaning of practices but also investigate the subjective purposes of the
actions of the actors involved (Colomer and Escatel, 2004). Once the empirical focus of
the analysis is not only relations but also experiences, it can be seen that clientelist
problem solving involves constructing personalized ties, an imagined solidaristic
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community, and a protective and predictable network that buffers the harsh everyday
reality of the slum.
Relations of clientilist domination exist in practice as relations that are useful
from the clients perspective for solving problems, obtaining protection against the risks
of everyday life, and making friends with someone who seems to really care.
While much attention is being given to Latin America’s need to follow the steps
of China, it is also true that a huge majority of Latin Americans are not even inserted into
their own countries legal economies. More than half of Latin Americans operate within
the informal economy.
While there are many Grameen-like banks now in Latin America, and growing
numbers of established commercial banks are getting into the micro-lending businesses,
many experts on poverty believe that the scope of these efforts are limited (Petras and
Vieux, 1997). They do a great job helping the poorest of the poor, but they do not help
the majority of the poor get access to larger loans that are necessary to start a small
business, hire employees and become successful entrepreneurs.
De Soto has argued that the best way to win the war over poverty is to give people
legal property rights and a valid commercial identity that would bring them into the
formal economy. That would allow millions of Latin America to use their homes as
collateral to get bank loans to start a new business, or to convince others beyond their
immediate family members to lend them money for commercial projects. As it is now
only the Latin American elites have access to the tools to create wealth. De Soto claims
that there needs to be enabling rights in Latin America. There are many prohibitive rules,
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but there are no enabling rules, that would allow most people to embark on commercial
deals with strangers (De Soto, 1989).

68

Chapter Three
Foreign Direct Investment in China and Latin America
The purpose of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is beneficial to a region
because it brings in capital, technology, and managerial ability. It also brings a channel
to access international markets. Policymakers in less developed countries (LDCs) know
that FDI is paramount in accelerating economic growth in the current global economic
environment.
The behavior of economic activities cannot be explained without reference to the
role of social and cultural factors (Havey, 1988). FDI is produced through a complex
historical process of embedding, in which the cultural, social, political, and economic
characteristics of the national home base play a dominant part (Dicken, 1992). These
arguments suggest that the importance of political and cultural factors should be
considered when analyzing FDI.
In the competition for limited foreign capital, states adopt strategies to maximize
the favorable impact of investments. States must compete with one and other for limited
investment by pursuing outward-oriented economic and trade policies to attract inward
FDI, while trying to ensure that the local firms benefit from such investments
(Ramamurti, 1999). According to Ramamurti, developing countries have not privatized
faster because bureaucratic interests, institutional constraints, and economic rigidities
have slowed the pace.
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Latin America and China both have different patterns in developing FDI. China
has the “dual-track approach,” which is both import-substituting industries and exportoriented industries (network-forming industries). Latin America’s incoming FDI has
remained of the import-substitution-type, and the development of international
production/distribution networks has yet to be seen.
According to Kimura and Ando, there are three lines of thought that must be
interpreted to explain the mechanics of international production/distribution networks
(Ando and Kimura, 2003). The first line of thought is fragmentation theory. In China,
location patterns are determined at the production process level, and the fragmentation
theory best explains the logic behind this. This thought is useful to analyze the patterns
of FDI going to developing countries to formulate cross-border production sharing
systems. Secondly, the agglomeration theory incorporates external economies of scale by
introducing the concept of space from city planning. Finally, the third line of thought is
the internalization theory of corporate firms. Firms set limits to upstream operations by
purchasing raw materials from other firms and sets limits to downstream operations by
selling products to other firms.
Ando and Kimura did a study on the proportion of machinery in total exports and
imports of major countries in the world for the year 2000. The study demonstrated that
the share of machinery in China’s total exports and imports was large. This study
suggested that there is an existence of active back-and-forth transactions of intermediate
goods in international production/distribution networks of machinery industries (Ando
and Kimura, 2003).
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It was also suggested by this study that countries in Latin America had a lower
share of machinery exports than China. This is an indication that Latin America still has
not yet formed networks in the machinery sector. In addition, the share of machinery
imports was greater than exports; therefore, this indicates that the Latin American
manufacturing production activities still have the import-substituting type.
In China, there is an abundance of human resources and stable macroeconomic
fundamentals. Adding to these factors, there is the importance of development strategies
applied by East Asian countries. This is called the network-forming-type FDI. This
triggered the formation of international production/distribution networks by hosting FDI,
extensive FDI facilitation, tariff reduction for semiconductor-related parts, and the duty
drawback system.
Ando and Kimura also demonstrated in another study that the Japanese
commitment to Latin America in terms of FDI has been very low when compared to
Japanese commitment to China. It was found that in China, manufacturing firms own
over 60 percent of the affiliates in the region (Ando and Kimura, 2004). However, in
Latin America the share affiliates with manufacturing firms are only 35 percent. This
indicates that manufacturing activities in Latin America by Japanese firms are much
smaller than in China.

FDI in Latin America
It is evident that Latin America is one of the fastest-growing economies in the
global market. The region is replete with natural resources and emerging service
industries, which make it globally competitive. FDI into Latin American countries
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almost doubled from 1985 to 1998 (Characteristics, 1999). More U.S. FDI flows into
Latin America than to the Middle East, Asia-Pacific or Africa (U.S. Department of
Commerce, 2003). FDI in Latin America reached a record $126 Billion in 2007
according to the UN conference on trade and development (UNCTAD). The strong FDI
growth was driven by new investment and expansions. The pattern was the result of
strong regional economic growth and elevated corporate profits on the back of high
commodity prices (Latin Business Chronicle, 2008). However, the one cultural
distinction that appears to conform to expectation is the fact that greater collectivism in
China attract more investment then in Latin America.
There have been success stories from Latin America that we can attribute to
market, such as Brazil. The Brazilian economy is the eleventh largest in the world and
the largest in Latin America. Former President Fernando Collor de Mello replaced
Brazil’s import-substitution strategy with an open-market economy and began a process
of privatization of the state-owned industries (Vanden and Provost, 2006). The lowering
of tariffs on imports reduced the barriers that protected Brazilian industry from
international competition. This embarked Brazil on a new economic course, sloughing
off decades of state-led growth and protectionism.
Another former president Fernando Henrique Cardosa believed that dependent
economies could develop in association with the industrialized world. During his
presidency, inflation was defeated in Brazil. Currently, Brazil has been able to control
inflation and fiscal austerity. New programs such as Fome Zero (No Hunger), which
guarantees sufficient food to Brazil’s poorest regions, have proved successful (Vanden
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and Provost, 2006). The constitution has been amended, bringing social security and tax
reforms.
Brazil can be regarded as one of the world’s great emerging markets. Transition
to democratic rule was successful, role of military in domestic politics is reduced and
corruption is less acceptable (Woods, 2007). Also, new social programs have been put
into place for education and public health.
Despite these advances, there are still social problems that not only affect Brazil,
but also the rest of Latin America. These include poverty and inequality. Unemployment
still dominates and there is a high rate of infant mortality. Redistributing income and
achieving government expenditures in health, education, and land reform can stretch the
budget even further and trigger inflation (Payne, Zovatto, Carrillo, and Zavala, 2002).
Brazil has consistently failed to achieve its potential. Greater fiscal and monetary
responsibility and low inflation have not yet enabled Brazil to shift to a higher long-run
sustainable growth rate. There are numerous obstacles to faster growth in Brazil. The
rate of investment is held back by low domestic savings, as in so many parts of Latin
America and unlike in China. High real interest rates discourage borrowing by the
private sector for productive purposes. Its income inequality is one of the worst in the
world (Payne, Zovatto, Carrillo, and Zavala, 2002). Brazil does not enjoy the benefits
such as high savings rates that are supposed to accompany an unequal distribution of
income.
Argentina has been a case study in the dangers of inconsistent policies. In the
1990’s, Argentina was the most neo-liberal economy in Latin America with widespread
privatization, complete capital account liberalization, and a large measure of trade
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liberalization, and a large measure of trade liberalization (Auyero, 2000). Economic
growth stopped after 1998, and authorities had no instruments at their disposal with
which to stimulate the economy.
The Cuban health system under the Castro regime has been lauded as one of the
major achievements of the revolution. Indeed, the Cuban revolution has attracted
appreciable and worldwide attention because of these purported successes in health care
access, infant mortality and life expectancy. In Cuba, health care is successful because
half of all the currency earned in the country goes toward the health-care system. Cutting
expenditures for the health care system is not an option.
Despite the abundance of natural resources not one republic has achieved the
status of a developed country. Unable to break into the circle of advanced capitalist
countries, Latin America has remained a peripheral region in which external influence
has been preeminent (Bulmer, Thomas, 2003).
There are several major urban areas in Latin America where laws and polity have
changed to encourage foreign investments. This can be seen in Argentina and Costa
Rica. Although there are changes, the benefits of economic growth are slowly coming to
many rural areas including a lack of entrepreneurial development. This is due to
entrenched elitists and poor governance including a lack of indigenous input.
Latin American economic development falls into three phases. The first is
traditional export-led growth based on primary products. This began slow and reached its
height in the first decade of the twentieth century, only to fade away in the wake of the
Great Depression. The second phase is the inward-looking development. This was based
on import-substitution and peaked in the quarter century after World War II. The third
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phase which is globalization, became dominant after the debt crisis of the 1980s (Lindert,
Skoufias, and Shapiro, 2005).
Argentina’s success with exporting cattle showed that export-led growth could
work well in the Latin American context. Most peripheral countries at the beginning of
the twentieth century regarded Argentina as a legitimate model, envying its wealth of
commodity export and diversified markets. During the inward-looking phase, the
Argentine economy declined significantly (Lindert, Skoufias, and Shapiro, 2005). It was
the agricultural protectionism in the developed countries and the accumulation of policy
errors during the inward-looking phase that led to the decline of the economy.
The inward-looking phase was a legitimate response to the problems in
international markets after 1913. The problem was that the phase began too slowly and
did not become the paradigm for the region until world trade had started to expand
rapidly after World War II. Eventually, the cost of the inward-looking model became too
high, however at the beginning the benefits were substantial (Lindert, Skoufias, and
Shapiro, 2005). For example, at the annual rate of growth increased for all republics.
Ensuring the development of the economy has always been difficult in Latin
America (Morley, 2005). In the presence of barriers, such as physical, economic, and
financial, the initial stimulus has often withered away before reaching low-productivity
activities in distant regions. Public policy has rightly been seen as crucial in the
destruction of these barriers.
Sectoral policies have a long and often successful history in Latin America. Meat
in Argentina, coffee in Guatemala, and oil in Venezuela are all commodities for which
the policy framework was an important ingredient in the emergence of a dynamic sector
75

in the first phase of post independence development. However, inadequate fiscal
resources and antiquated tax structures have usually prevented Latin American
governments from making the expenditures needed to increase the flexibility of the
economic system (Morley, 2001). Potentially productive regions remained trapped by
the lack of communications, unable to develop an agricultural surplus, and provide a
market for industrial goods.
In Latin America, it is difficult to find many manufacturing affiliates in industries
different from their manufacturing parent firm, as opposed to China, where it is easy
(Morley, 2001). This means that switching industries within the manufacturing sector is
rare in Latin America. Instead, almost all affiliates in industries different from that of
their manufacturing parent firm are found in the wholesale trade sector. This point
suggests that Japanese manufacturing parents establish affiliates in Latin America to sell
products to local markets, sometimes with simple local processing, rather than building
dense production networks.
From the study mentioned above, we see the difference in the development of
international production networks between China and Latin America. The contrast is
generated by economic initial conditions and policy environment for incoming FDI.
Annually, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) surveys the
Japanese MNEs. One of the key questions asks for a list of countries that they think are
potential destinations for their FDI in the short and long—run. In 2001 and 2002, China
was the most important destination for forthcoming FDI. Latin America lagged way
behind. Despite the size of Latin America’s market, there has been a barrier preventing
Japanese firms from investing in Latin America.
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The conditions that were important for attracting FDI to China were market
potential and inexpensive labor (Marugami, 2003). International production/distribution
networks in China are being developed utilizing new economic login such as
fragmentation, agglomeration, and optimal internalization. Conversely, Latin America
has yet to succeed in developing such networks. With differences in economic
background, regional trade arrangements would have completely different effects.
With the formation of the FTAA, potential investors outside the region are likely
to watch the formation process with optimism and concern. The concern includes that of
a possibility of discriminatory treatment against non-regional investors. Most of the FDI
in Latin America still have the import-substituting-type with trade protection. According
to Ando and Kimura, if tariffs are removed by FTAA, incumbent investors will face more
competition and be forced to reorganize their activities in frameworks beyond their
national borders (Ando and Kimura, 2004). The positive side is that inefficient firms will
exit the market while competitive firms will expand their operations. Ando and Kimura
also state the MNEs from outside the region would face serious disadvantages in
competing with intra-regional MNEs because MNEs must often import some of their key
parts and components from their home country. This is due in part because local
supporting industries in LDCs are typically immature (Ando and Kimura, 2004).
Secondly, Latin American countries should construct and implement policy
packages to stimulate the formation of international production/distribution networks.
Also essential are policy measures to reduce service link costs and to encourage the
creation of a critical mass of agglomeration. With these points, Latin America can
possibly learn from the Chinese experience.
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Since 1995, three Spanish banks-Banco Santander, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, and
Banco Central Hispano-have become the largest foreign banks in Latin America
(Maudos, 1997). These Spanish banks saw Latin America as a great region to expand
internationally for many reasons: the commonality of the Spanish language has made
Latin America comfortable for the Spanish and permits easy communication; also, the
Spanish banks already had some familiarity with the region.
Although the timing and sequence of economic and political opening differ by
country, the logical historical reference point is the Latin American debt and banking
crisis of 1982. Since then, and as the Latin American lost decade lingered on,
democratically elected presidents came to power across the region. These governments,
with the support of broad coalitions of the middle class and business interests, managed
to introduce market-oriented reforms of the financial system including liberalization of
foreign entry. As Gross pointed out, from 1971-1987, the Andean pact countries barred
foreign banks from owning more than 20 percent of local banks (Gross, 1997). Thus,
only recently have these countries banking sectors become ripe for foreign investment.
The Spanish banks were not the only ones to respond to the developing
opportunity. Following the start of the Spanish push in 1995, a number of foreign banks
also started to buy banks in Latin America. The two with the widest geographic scope
were Bank of Nova Scotia and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (Wang and
Hu, 1999). There are three sets of explanations for the Spanish banks’ rise to Latin
American investment. The first is asset seeking. The Spanish banks have been seeking
to enter markets that permit them faster growth and higher margins than they are able to
achieve at home. Latin America differs from the Chinese emerging market and the
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advanced markets in terms of the development of the banking sector (The Gazette, 2007,
March 30). The ratio of money supply GDP is lower than elsewhere. Also, expenses in
Latin America and interest margins are higher than elsewhere (World Bank, World
Development Indicators, 1998).
The second set is asset exploring. The Spanish banks are not just passive
acquirers of assets. The Spanish banks believe that they have something to offer. That
is, they believe that they can improve cash flows in their acquisitions. The Spanish
Banks have transferred knowledge from Spain to Latin America. One obvious parent
contribution has been the introduction of an aggressive posture built on the introduction
of new products. Wherever local regulations have permitted it, the Spanish banks have
introduced the lottery-linked deposit accounts they offer in Spain (Guillen and Tschoegl,
1998). The banks also have improved the issuing, pricing and term of mortgages relative
to all the banks targeting the mass market of bank branches. Now that these countries are
recovering from the lost-decade, the situation is one in which the opportunities for growth
may not depend solely on taking market share away from others.
In addition to asset seeking and exploring, the whole expansion of the Spanish
banks represent a case of oligopolistic reaction. In the “oligopolistic” reaction pattern
that Flowers first identified, a firm matches the location choices of a rival in a pattern of
move-countermove (Flowers, 1976). In the case of the Spanish banks, a leapfrogging of
leadership occurs so that at some point one can no longer unambiguously describe one
firm or the other as the overall leader.
Spanish banking FDI in Latin America requires understanding the shifting
competitive environment of banking over the last decade. Financial deregulation and
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privatization in Latin America have opened up new horizons, and have enhanced
competition via product differentiation and effective leverage of new information and
telecommunications and technologies.

FDI in China
China, up until recently, used to be a country with high barriers to foreign
investment. Foreign investment is a recent phenomenon in China. China’s regulatory
framework for FDI has improved gradually over time since opening up to international
trade. China, currently, is one the most attractive locations for FDI in the world
(Benjamin and Brandt, 1997). The success of China in attracting FDI has been attributed
to a variety of factors including market size, a low cost of labor, liberalized FDI policy,
political stability and improved infrastructure. Much of the FDI in China can be
contributed to its cultural and geographic proximity to major Asian sources, among
which are Japan and the newly industrialized economies.
Most of the ethnic Chinese companies are family-owned. Although in recent
years some of them have been listed as public companies, they remain under the effective
control of the founding families. In addition to making investment in China themselves,
ethnic Chinese outside China have also played a major role in facilitating FDI from other
foreign companies. Foreign companies seeking to invest in China realize the advantages
of ethnic Chinese in adapting to China’s institutional environment. Many of them have
used Chinese employees or middlemen to facilitate their negotiations and operations,
including Chinese students both returning to China and remaining abroad (Rubin, 1995).
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In China there are still many overlapping responsibilities between local
government agencies and central government sectoral ministries and departments.
Efficient public interest regulation is an essential part of developing and maintaining a
policy environment conducive to private sector growth and investment. Unfortunately,
according to Henley, Kirkpatrick, and Wilde, China has a poor reputation for
transparency and bureaucracy (1999). Because China does not yet publish its rules and
regulations, applicable laws are difficult to determine. Property rights and contract laws
are still weak. Moreover, language and cultural barriers, corruption and legal
uncertainties also present difficulties to foreign investors. The existence of internal rules
and regulations, which are unavailable to foreigners, has long been a source of contention
and uncertainty for investors.
However, the above-mentioned problems can give the overseas Chinese an edge.
Some overseas Chinese firms have managed to turn these problems to their advantage
through informal channels such as personal contact and family connections. Through
these networks, trade and investment information is passed along and deals are done.
Much of China’s inward FDI comes from countries or regions with a large
presence of Chinese or ethnic Chinese. Other factors besides ethnicity and common
language have contributed to large FDI flows from Hong Kong and Taiwan into China.
These factors include geographic proximity, labor costs, and market potential. As
Taiwan and Hong Kong are more technologically advanced and experience increases in
labor costs, it is natural for businesses in these two regions to turn to China. China offers
an unlimited supply of cheap labor and a potentially large market.
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In 1995, there were about 55 million ethnic Chinese living outside mainland
China (Yeung and Olds, 2000). The recent rise of East and Southeast Asia in the world
economy has encouraged renewed interest in overseas Chinese networks. It is evident
that ethnic Chinese networks do display flexibility and efficiency in certain settings and
have been successful in Southeast Asia where market institutions are weak.
Ethnic Chinese networks have been strengthened by the formation of large-scale
formal overseas Chinese associations. Examples to demonstrate is since the 1960s about
one hundred world conventions of overseas Chinese associations have been held. Some
associations enjoy strong financial support from ethnic Chinese business leaders and
political backing from their local communities.
China experienced tremendous growth in inward FDI during the last two decades
or so. Prior to 1978 when the economic reforms started, FDI was prohibited in China.
Since then, FDI in China has grown to $45.3 billion by 1997 annually and total
cumulative FDI has reached $220 billion. According to UNCTAD China is the larges
FDI recipient in the developing world (UNCTAD, 1996).
In much of the 1980s, foreign invested firms were required to export a major
portion of their output. Restrictions on foreign exchange also forced foreign invested
companies to sell output outside China to earn hard currency in order to pay for imported
inputs. Many domestic markets were closed to these firms. As a result, until 1991,
almost all-industrial output by foreign invested firms was exported (Naughton, 1996).
Given the limited access to China’s domestic market, low labor costs should be an
important factor explaining FDI in China.
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By the 1990s, China became the second largest FDI recipient in the world. There
is a great disparity of FDI among regions in terms of geographical distribution. The
“open door policy” started with the creation of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the
southern zones. The opening of other SEZs in coastal cities in the 80s followed this. FDI
started to spread to other provinces when the authorities adopted more economic reforms
in the 90s.
The increasing openness of China to the outside world is seen in the fast growth
of its foreign trade. Because China exempts many goods from import duties, actual tariff
collection has been lower. The collection rate has a very low percentage rate in China.
When explaining FDI in China, two determinants are considered: domesticmarket FDI is produced by size and growth of the host country (China Daily, 2003, Nov.
14). Export-oriented FDI mainly looks for cost competitiveness. To explain what
impacts FDI in China, there are three factors to consider. These factors are economic
structure, liberalization and preferential policies, and cultural and legal environment.
The strong market potential that China has to offer has attracted FDI. Many
European and American multinationals have set up factories in China with the purpose to
produce for the domestic market. Low wage costs appear to have played an important
role in attracting FDI to China. It has also been proven that provinces where the
infrastructure is more developed have received more FDI (China Daily, 2003, Nov. 14).
Once a province has attracted a critical mass of FDI, it is easier for them to attract more
FDI as foreign investors perceive the presence of other foreign investors. In addition, it
is more efficient for foreign multinationals to locate in the same area. This allows them
to share information and facilities. The coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian,
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which are close to Hong Kong, have been the largest recipients of FDI and have acquired
a significant advantage attracting FDI than the inland provinces (Sun, 1999).
There are many theories of FDI that demonstrate the causes of FDI in China
(Zhang, 2001). The location advantage of China possesses a large pool of unskilled
workers. Growing countries or regions such as Taiwan and Hong Kong invest heavily in
China to take advantage of low labor costs. However, much FDI in China is still
unskilled labor-intensive production aiming at the export markets in the developing
world.
There were other reasons explaining why foreign firms set up production facilities
in China. By 1994, foreign invested firms were able to sell half of their output in China’s
domestic markets. Even before China’s years of reform, many companies ventured into
China realizing its large market potential.
FDI tends to be more likely to promote economic growth when host countries
adopt liberalized trade regime, improve education, and human capital conditions. The
growing interest in China as a host to FDI is a reflection of favorable economic
performance and prospects, and policy regimes that are open to both international trade
and capital flows. In comparison, Latin America is lacking in both economic and policy
attributes that stimulate FDI. There is an economic instability and political uncertainty
dominating the region.
In another study conducted by Jonathon Doh using a database of
telecommunication projects in emerging markets around the world, they investigated how
differences in the economic and cultural characteristics of Latin America and China
affect private infrastructure investment. He found that in general, attracting private
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participation telecommunications infrastructure investment is more diverse along cultural
dimensions in China than in Latin America countries (Doh, 2000). Chinese attracting
investment are more individualistic, have high power distance and have less uncertainty
avoidance than Latin American countries attracting private participation investors.
By studying the telecommunications infrastructure, Doh also found that Latin
American countries attracting private participation investors have agreed to more telecom
liberalization commitments, tend to allow more competition and, therefore, less
monopoly protection, and have lower tariff levels than China (Doh, 2000). The Chinese
attracting private participation investors are more diverse than Latin American countries
in terms of tariffs.
In China, variations in institutional change across regions play a critical role in
attracting foreign investment to a region. Given the homogeneous and stable institutions
settings across regions in the West, local regions compete only through various industrial
incentive systems, such as local taxes, to attract foreign investment.
China’s interior region is known for its poor physical infrastructure, inadequacy
of human resources, lack of business philosophy, and ailing environment (Sims, Schiff,
and James, 2000). It is less attractive to foreign investors than the coastal belt, however,
the interior has received a significant amount of FDI. In terms of the actual value, it was
the recipient of 12% of all FDI in China between 1978-2001 (MOFTEC, 2002). This is a
small proportion in relative terms, but in absolute terms, it its large. By 2001, 32, 993
foreign enterprises were established in interior areas with an investment value of $2
billion (SSB, 2002).
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The relationship among FDI/foreign parent firms, personal networks, and
institutional involvement have a hierarchical structure: the larger the foreign parent firms,
the more institutional involvement, while the smaller the foreign parent firms, the more
personal networks are involved (Qui, 2004).
It is argued that the embeddedness of FDI in personal networks and institutional
involvement is perhaps best observed in peripheral regions, such as China’s interior. The
economic conditions and policy environment in China vary substantially among regions,
and there are major structural differences between the coastal and interior provinces. In
the coastal region, economic reforms and an open door policy were introduced early, and
as a consequence, the economy has become highly liberalized and has shifted from the
traditional centrally planned system to a market economy (Sun, 1999). Because of their
proximity to foreign countries and regions, the coastal area are more commercially
advanced then is the rest of the country (Tsai, 2002). For example, certain economic
innovations such as the encouragement of private business and informal financing at the
ground level appeared in places like Zhejiang and Fujian (two coastal provinces) well
before they were officially acknowledged by the central government (Tsai, 2002). Int
contrast, the interior region experienced the preponderance of “sociolist construction”
and heavy investment in central planning during the pre-1978 period which has left it
with a more conservative reputation than the coastal provinces. The interior appears to
have a greater stake in preserving its old state-subsidized positions and exhibits more
resistance to marketization processes. Furthermore, economic reforms and the opendoor were not introduced in the region until the beginning of the 1990’s, a decade later
than in the coastal areas (Sun, 1999). Thus, its institutional infrastructure is problematic
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and less attractive to foreign investors. As a result, business and risk are greater in the
interior than on the coast and provide the breeding ground for the existence of personal
networks and institutional involvement to facilitate FDI activities.
An understanding of China’s processes of integration into the global economy
will be enhanced if the interior is included in the analysis. The interior is important to the
Chinese economy. It has always played a big role as an economic powerhouse for
China’s economic development and supplies China with a significant proportion of the
raw materials that are required to create manufactured products. The rapid economic
growth of the coastal belt over the past 20 years has depended heavily on the investor’s
energy and minerals supplies (Chen, 2000).
Recent Chinese regional policy has paid particular attention to the interior.
Throughout the 1980’s coastal-interior regional disparities accelerated; the annual growth
rate of the real per-capita gross domestic product in the coastal areas was three percent
faster than that in the interior (Wang and Hu, 1999). To attack these problems, since the
early 1990’s, the central state has proposed channeling more investment into the interior.
In 1999, the Great Western Development Strategy, was launched with the aim of steering
state investment, outside expertise, foreign investment, outside expertise, foreign
investment, and private capital into the parts of China that are most in need of and the
least likely to attract aid on their own.
FDI has been playing a more important role in the economic development of the
interior and the integration of the interior into the world economy. FDI has been one of
the most significant features of China’s economic reform and opening up to the outside
world since 1978 (UNCTAD, 2003). Throughout the 1980’s because of China’s
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adoption of a coastal-biased regional policy, the majority of FDI went into the coastal
region. FDI has contributed significantly to the opening-up and catching-up processes of
some of the interior provinces.
It is predicted that the role played by FDI in the economic development of the
interior will be greater (Lane, 1998). Foreign investors have become more familiar with
the market and intend gradually to increase their participation in less-developed areas,
where land and labor are cheaper than in the coastal areas and the market potentials have
been largely unexplored.
A case study of Shaanxi province done by Ying Qui highlights the importance of
personal networks and institutional involvement in determining the locational choices of
FDI. Shaanxi is located in the middle of China. Political institutions have a particularly
strong influence on Shaanxi’s economy because the province has close linkages with the
central state. In the pre-reform era, Shaanxi was described as a “transfusion” economy,
since its economic growth and development relied heavily on constant transfusions of
capital, subsidies, and grants from the central government (Lane, 1998). This had a great
impact on its present economic structure. Today, Shaanxi is the most important location
in China in terms of the total number of military enterprises and its strength and breadth
in science and technology rank third nationwide (Liang, 2002). Shaanxi’s close
relationship with the central government offered the province new opportunities when the
central government readjusted its regional policies gradually to favor the interior from the
early 1990’s onward.
The downside to the close relationship between the central government and
Shaanxi is the political decentralization and transformation from a planned economy to a
88

market economy in the province has been slow compared to those in the coastal
provinces. This factor increases the difficulty and uncertainty of investment and provide
the breeding ground for personal networks and institution’s involvement that
consequently exert an important influence on FDI activities.
There is enormous heterogeneity in the interior, and Shaanxi has some features
that make it unique in the region. Shaanxi was chosen as a case study because it provides
insights into some of the important processes that shape FDI flows into China’s interior.
According to this study, economic considerations are embedded in cultural and political
considerations, which include personal networks, and institutional involvement. This
survey showed that the linkage between personal networks and institutional involvement
is networks, which are prevalent in the everyday life of Chinese society (Xin and Pearce,
1996). This survey also showed that the use of networks is not confined to individuals; it
also operates it at the institutional level. The popularity of networks at the institutional
level can be regarded as the use of personal networks by groups of individuals.
Qui clearly points out that the Shaanxi survey is not representative of China’s
interior as a whole. This study was done to just shed light on some important features of
the embeddedness of FDI, in informal and formal institutions, which contribute to an
understanding of FDI flows into peripheral regions. Economic activities, such as FDI
flows, are socially, politically, and culturally embedded in time-space contexts. Many
unsuccessful regions do not possess the advantages enjoyed by successful regions, such
as easy access to international markets. In this regard, formal and informal institutions
can provide the basis for localized social and economic networks and contracts.
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Chapter Four
Labor Markets in China and Latin America
The labor market is the medium through which labor moves from rural to urban
areas. Scholars have not been able to come to an agreement as to how well labor markets
have been functioning during the past two decades in China. Some researchers believe
that significant barriers still exist in China’s economy, and that the absence of wellfunctioning rural labor markets has delayed growth (Benjamin and Brandt, 1997). Others
show that labor markets are used in assigning jobs and wages (Meng, 1995). Cook,
Knight and Song all contend that healthy rural labor markets have emerged and are
continuing to evolve in a positive direction in China (Cook, 1999; Knight & Song, 2001).
In analyzing the relationship between education and the labor market, I found that
in rural China, students returning to school are very low. According to a study done by
Mincer, China stands out as having one of the lowest rates of return in the world. This
would explain why labor markets in China have not been functioning well. In other
studies, it has been found that the rates of return to human capital in recent years may be
higher for labor market participants that are more like those in other developing
countries. This would go along with the hypothesis that better functioning labor markets
in recent years are being reflected by rising returns to human capital.
By researching other studies the one explanation I found to be more consistent is
that human capital has continued to be increasingly rewarded in rural China’s labor
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markets. As de Brauw found, this is proof that the labor market is improving (de Brauw,
2002). Increasing educational availability in rural areas would be a good policy
instrument for increasing rural incomes. If rural education was made a top priority by
China’s government, then there would be an increase in rural incomes.
Economically speaking, foreign investments not only contribute to the overall
output of China but also to the employment of a large proportion of the labor force. It is
well-known that MNCs operating in less developed countries could have a positive or
negative impact on the development and welfare of the host country. Critics such as De
George claim that MNCs exploit the less developed countries through cheap labor, lower
the cost of resources, and impoverish the less developed countries (De George, 1999).
Advocates of MNCs agree that multinationals are less hostile than their local competitors
to demands such as safe working environment and promotion opportunities in the interest
of boosting productivity.
In China, there are four major forms of enterprise ownership: the state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), the collectives, the foreign-investment enterprises, and other private
enterprises. Kit-Chun Lam evaluated the ethical performance of the foreign-investment
enterprises and compared them to local enterprises with different forms of ownership.
The difference between the behavior of foreign-investment enterprises and the
other types of ownerships is that the foreign-investment enterprise is allowed to compete
in the market and is given more flexibility in their pricing and employment decisions than
the local socialistic enterprises. It also has a different business culture from that of the
indigenous enterprises.
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A direct contribution of foreign-investment enterprises to the welfare of the
Chinese workers and the country as a whole is job and income creation. This
contribution is notable in China where the economy is far from full employment and
plenty of useful labor resources are available. Without the foreign-investment
enterprises, employment opportunities in China would have been much less.
Furthermore, the foreign-investment enterprises can also contribute to the earnings
potential of the workers by increasing their labor productivity through the use of
relatively more advanced technologies.
Critics of MNCs argue that MNCs are drawing skilled workers away from
indigenous enterprises, causing under-development of the indigenous enterprises. Chun
Lam postulates that this argument does not apply to China. The average education level
of workers in foreign-investment enterprises is in fact slightly lower than that in stateowned enterprises, and is slightly higher than that in other private enterprises. The reality
is that foreign-investment enterprises do provide employment to both low-skilled workers
in China. Even if the foreign-investment enterprises employ more skilled workers in the
future, it will only be good for the development of economy that human capital
investment is stimulated by the presence of job opportunities for the high-skilled workers.
Foreign-investment enterprises are ethically good for China to the extent that they bring
about desirable consequences of employment and income creation as they increase the
growth potential of the economy and improve the welfare of the workers.
A study done by Chun Lam resulted in explaining that higher average wage in
foreign-investment enterprises is consistent with the argument that foreign-investment
enterprises are more efficient in the use of resources, more productive and therefore able
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to pay higher wages to their workers. Chun Lam argues that if this were the case, the
diffusion of technology and management skills from the foreign-investment enterprises to
the rest of the economy is expected to generate important positive external effects on the
Chinese economy.
In analyzing the study provided by Chun Lam, I observed that ethical
performance of foreign-investment enterprises is good compared with other local firms,
and many common accusations against multinational corporations do not apply to
foreign-investment enterprises in China. Foreign-investment enterprises have been
morally good in creating employment and income, and offering wages higher than that in
other local firms. They also promote the growth of the economy by bringing in new
technologies and raise labor productivity and income. In China where there is
considerable unemployment and unutilized resources, the contribution of foreigninvestment enterprises in promoting welfare through employment and income creation is
important.
The shift toward liberalization and economic restructuring in Latin America has
provoked debate about reforming labor laws (Ffrench-Davis, 2005). The debate has
raised a number of intriguing questions about current labor laws and institutions creating
obstacles to structural adjustment. Another question brought to mind is if reforms are
necessary, then what kinds of changes should governments adopt?
In Reforming the Labor Market in a Liberalized Economy, Gustavo Marques
writes that many labor laws in Latin America undermine the capacity of firms to adjust to
changing market conditions. While intended to provide job security and limit
competition, labor regulations impose costly restrictions on hiring and firing, sanction
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practices that result in low productivity, and create incentive structures that result in high
job turnover. Researchers who believe this theory argue that the governments’ role in
bargaining should be limited to enforcing labor contracts, and labor agreements should
encourage work rules that improve efficiency. At the same time, labor laws should aim
to reduce strikes and conflict and establish minimum standards for remuneration and
occupational safety.
Writing from a similar perspective, writers such as John Pencavel examined
unions and labor movements in Latin America. He suggested that although unions can
help promote democratization and raise productivity, they often increase members’
wages and unemployment for unskilled workers. Gains made currently by unions may
also reduce investment, which in turn, leads to less economic growth and lower
employment in the future.
Carola Pessino notes that despite structural reforms adopted in Argentina,
employment growth has been slow while unemployment and wage differentials have
grown. A number of factors may have led to high unemployment, but she believes that
labor regulations also played some role. High payroll taxes, expensive severance
payments, and rigid collective bargaining agreements have reduced demand for labor and
also created obstacles to labor mobility and wage flexibility in Argentina.
Since Chile’s labor laws and institutions were transformed during the period of
military rule, they often figure prominently in discussions about the impact of labor
reform in Latin America (Lear and Collins, 1995). Since the resumption of democracy,
unions have fared better, although collective bargaining remains decentralized and the
rate of unionization fell between 1991 and 1996. However, the government has taken
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steps to promote talks between employers and unions, and these discussions have resulted
in important policy changes.
Scholars cast doubt on the claim that strong labor standards have affected
employment negatively. While labor-law reforms in the early 1990s increased employer
severance payments for layoffs, job creation remained strong throughout the decade.
These scholars argue that macroeconomic stability has been far more important in job
creation than institutional factors (Fernandez-Kelly and Shefner, 2006).
Since the early 1980s, labor-market conditions have worsened throughout most of
Latin America. Some researchers, such as Petras and Vieux, have focused on the IMF
and other international organizations linked to the U.S. government in explaining the
spread of adjustment programs throughout Latin America. They suggest that the U.S.
companies pursued structural adjustment because these policies guaranteed U.S.
companies greater opportunities in Latin America, while debt-service payment helped
shore up a weak U.S. economy (Petras and Vieux, 1997).
Petras and Vieux’s analysis of the political responses to neoliberal reform is
considered by some to be unsatisfactory on several different levels. The authors fail to
note that the impact and strength of political movements against neoliberalism vary from
country to country. They provide little evidence to support their assertion that
widespread protest against liberalization is spreading throughout Latin America (Petras
and Vieux, 1997). The authors also fail to pay attention to organized labor’s activities
during the last two decades. If they included more information on labor movements, they
might have noted that some unions have supported reform in exchange for certain wage
and employment concessions.
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Although Latin American countries attracting investment are higher in terms of
uncertainty avoidance than their Chinese counterparts, project sizes are larger and tend to
be more diverse, and there is greater private participation. This disallows the insurance
of sovereignty and security over critical infrastructure. These projects tend to have
relatively smaller shares of investments by other nations’state-owned enterprises, which
is pro sovereignty. This could relate to collectivism considerations. But more work
would need to be done to defend that.
As Doh has suggested, there are learning effects among countries in regions so
that countries may follow patterns set by others in their regions (Doh, 2000). His
conclusions suggest that initial approaches and investments in a newly open
infrastructure market set a pattern not just for subsequent practices in that market, but
also throughout the region. An additional factor is that the same principal foreign
investors tend to participate in multiple projects within a given region. For example, as
Doh’s study suggest, companies such as Telefonia and France Telecom have been active
investors in Latin America and have participated in multiple projects in the same
countries (Doh, 2000). Hence, there are various results that have derived from regional
homogeneity: early investments that set a pattern followed by later project transactions
within a specific country, the participation of a limited number of investors in multiple
projects who adopt similar practices in the range of projects in which they participate,
and cultural homogeneity in the region would tend to increase the potential relevance of
learning within one market and the region for valid transference within the region, despite
evidence of greater project diversity in Latin America.
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Latin American labor codes favor full-time indefinite employment over part-time,
fixed-term, or temporary contracts. These types of contracts differ not only in the length
of the employment relationship, but also in the conditions for termination. Latin
American countries severely restrict the termination of a contract. Labor codes mandate
a minimum period for notifying workers prior to termination, determine which causes are
considered just of unjust causes for dismissal, and establish compensation to be awarded
to workers for each possible cause of termination (Marquez, 1998).
Most Latin American nations retain strict labor regulations that make it difficult to
dismiss employees. Hiring has become cumbersome. As a result of this, Latin American
employers find it difficult to adapt to quickly changing economies and business demands.
Employers in Latin America today are hamstrung by protectionist measures. In
Nicaragua, it is insufficient grounds to dismiss an employee when somebody else does
his work. Even in some countries where redundancy is a justification for dismissal,
employers must notify and seek the approval from third parties, such as labor unions or
labor ministries, before they fire someone.
The cost of firing an employee can be prohibitive. In Brazil, the combination of
advance notice requirements, severance packages and penalties is the equivalent of
paying three years of the fired worker’s salary.
Hiring has also become costly. As soon as someone is hired, the employer has to
pay payroll taxes and make social security payments to cover everything from a
retirement fund to health and unemployment insurance. This is typical, even in the
developed countries but, in the Latin American economy, economic development is
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highly impacted. Today, such payments are two to three times higher in Argentina,
Brazil and Colombia than in the United States or Norway (OECD, 1999).
According to World Bank data, Latin America suffers from the greatest imbalance
by keeping strict regulations to protect those already employed and making it more
expensive for employers to hire new workers (World Bank, 2006). Therefore, piecemeal
jobs are created.
Today, an estimated 23 million people in Latin America are jobless and 103
million work in an informal job sector that includes people selling goods on the street as
well as day laborers. In some Latin American countries, this informal sector makes up to
60 percent of the labor force. This labor crisis explains why in opinion polls, Latin
Americans want jobs over anything else, including personal safety, and would even
consider a system different from democracy if it gave them jobs.
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Chapter Five
Business Funding in China and Latin America
A survey of private firms conducted in 1999 by the International Finance
Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank Group, revealed that about
80 percent of businesses in China considered their lack of access to finance to be a
serious constraint. They relied heavily on self-financing for both start-up and expansion.
In the case of post-start-up investments, the sample firms continued to overwhelmingly
depend on internal sources (World Bank, 2002). Among external funding sources,
informal channels, credit unions, and commercial banks were about equally represented.
Outside equity, including public equity, and public debt markets played an insignificant
role.
As it is pointed out from the survey, internal sources tend to become less
important as firms grow larger. External sources for the smallest firms are mainly
informal channels and Chinese firms rely more on external sources of financing.
The state owned commercial banks in China control about 70 percent of bank
deposits and make about 70 percent of loans (Mellor, 2004). SOEs account for 80
percent of outstanding loans while producing just one third of output (The Economist,
2004).
There have been extensive reforms that have been instituted in recent years to
address many of the problems in the financial system. An example is the new regulatory
99

regime for bank lending, a shift from a funds constraint to what is viewed as a capital
constraint. This has encouraged the development of a large-scale deposit gathering
networks.
While an earlier rise over 1994-1997 reflected FDI inflows, there was a decline in
the rate of increase up to 2000 following the Asian crisis. The recent incline reflects
continuing FDI flows (Ryan, 2004). While China’s exports have been growing strongly,
so have its imports. About half of China’s imports are employed in further processing
and over 40 percent of China’s exports embody imports (Prasad, 2004).
Theory proposes that international financial capital flows should provide for a
more efficient allocation of capital, including a greater diversification of asset holding for
investors. Inflows should encourage improved economic growth performance by
augmenting domestic savings, lowering the cost of capital, and facilitating the
development of local institutions (Prasad and Wei, 2005). For achieving the benefits
from capital liberalization, it is critical to have prudential controls and regulations, a
stable macro economy and a supportive institutional environment. China’s access to FDI
has allowed more of the upside benefits while compensating for the poorly performing
domestic finance sector and problems with SOEs (Huang, 2003).
Enforceable trust reduces costs in social exchanges such as interpersonal loans
and pooling of funds. In China’s reform process, private entrepreneurs have found it very
hard to obtain bank loans due to political discrimination. Thus, informal financial
institutions similar to rotary credit associations (such as biaohui) have been very
important channels for providing start-up capital or emergency cash for small-scale
private businesses (Tsai, 2002). The fledgling market system implies that formal and
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impersonal channels of information flow are sluggish. Thus, social networks are
essential in channeling market information.
In sum, kinship networks confer all three types of social capital benefits for
private entrepreneurs. These three are the following: protecting private property rights,
reducing uncertainty and transaction costs, and building better bridges to market
information and entrepreneurial opportunity. Kinship networks lower the entry barriers
and raise the survival and success rates of private entrepreneurs.
Another reason why the Latin American informal networks are not as efficient as
China’s is because of the absence of opportunities for large segments of the population.
The exclusion of some groups on the basis of their gender, ethnic origin, or social status
explains why the Latin American economy is not as organized as China’s. Instead of the
informal networks stimulating growth in Latin America, it increases social exclusion.
Narrow bands of trust preset small businesses with hard choices. Low-trust
societies are at a disadvantage in a global market place. The reason is because foreigners
cannot be trusted in those societies. Growth only occurs sometimes when extended
family members could be brought into the managerial ranks of organization expansion.
Low-trust economies not only have limited opportunities for growth within their own
intra-organizational networks, the narrowness of relational activity negatively impacts
opportunities and well being of others in those communities. Most modern liberalized
democracies are not hindered by cultural, bureaucratic, elitist, religious restraints.
Latin America is a region with serious problem of poverty and lack of equity,
which affect vast sectors of the population. As a result of this situation, it has been
considered the continent with greatest levels of inequality. The mobilization of culture
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can be a very valuable factor in the fight against poverty. The poor lack material wealth,
but they do store an immense amount of culture that goes back for hundreds of years.
Respect for their culture will help create favorable conditions for making use in social
programs of their accumulated knowledge and traditions.
Latin America is growing at a pace above its historical average, within the context
of a strong global economy. Despite this growth, there are important divergences when it
comes to evaluating the economies as a whole. The high growth that has occurred in
recent years is concentrated in those countries that faced a very serious crisis at the
beginning of this decade, including Argentina and Uruguay, which faced serious
problems from 1999-2002 (Montiel, 2003). Venezuela confronted another economic
crisis of a similar character in 2002 and 2003 (Economist, 2004).
The IMF warns that in the absence of more reforms, growth will slow down in the
future. The IMF warns that Latin America is falling behind other emerging regions such
as those in Asia, specifically China. The great challenge facing Latin American
economies is to carry out reforms that not only prolong the current buoyant conditions,
but also reduce obstacles to future growth.
There are three areas where Latin American countries need to commit to making
reforms. They have to modify their tax and customs policy, since tax collections are at a
very low level, and that leads to low budgets, which are tied to the problem of rigidity,
which does not allow them to apply appropriate spending policy. In Latin America, the
allocation of revenues toward specific goals and the obligatory nature of certain expenses
jointly absorb a substantial proportion of the public deficit.
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In addition, some governmental reforms are necessary in order to achieve more
stable and less corrupt political systems. The IMF believes that growth in many Latin
American countries will continue to be limited by the weaknesses of the State. The
consequences of this weakness include deficient public services; a fragile judicial system;
high rates of crime and corruption; tax evasion, and a sizable informal economy.
It is necessary for Latin American economies to undertake reforms aimed at
achieving financial institutions that are stable and solvent, both in the public and private
sectors. The most serious problem in Latin America continues to be the poor distribution
of wealth. When it comes to poverty, the situation is not positive. Poverty rates remain
extremely high. The data about the region’s contribution to global GDP are clear, and
other emerging regions. In 2003, Latin Americans contribution to global wealth fell to
4.3%, while China’s grew to 3.9% (World Bank, 2006).
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Chapter Six
Latin American and Chinese Economic Situation
These last couple of years has been good for Latin America’s financial markets.
Currencies in Brazil, Chile and Mexico gained against the dollar on speculation that local
yields will maintain their attractiveness in anticipation of the US Federal Reserves halt as
interest rates increases. A diversity of deals are continuing apace, from Colombia’s
$1.13 billion buyback of dollars led by Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch to Mexican
household goods manufacturer Controladora Mabe’s sale of $200 million in privately
placed notes (Economist, 2004).
Despite the deals being made, these accomplishments are products of the region’s
financial performance, not its competitiveness. Unless Latin America becomes more
competitive, it will become irrelevant in the global economy. The region’s remarkable
growth trajectory is unimpressive when one considers the decline at the beginning of the
decade (Montiel, 2003). Also, Latin America is growing economically almost
exclusively because of external factors, especially a growing world economy and high
commodity prices.
The Latin American economy has grown at a five percent rate for the past five
years, but China’s has been growing at a 10% rate for nearly three decades (Hill, 2007).
In terms of poverty reduction, the context is even starker. China cut poverty from 50% of
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its population in 1970 to 19% presently. Latin America reduced poverty only from 43%
of its population to 36% over the same period (Hill, 2007).
The Chinese, along with other Asian countries are guided by pragmatism and
obsessed with the future, while many Latin American countries are guided by ideology
and obsessed with the past. In an article written for the Washington Post, Oppenheimer
relates the times he visited China and Venezuela. Upon arriving in China, he learned that
top government officials had recently welcomed the entire board of directors of
McDonalds. A few weeks earlier, while traveling in South America, he learned that the
Chavez government had announced a three-day suspension of all McDonalds restaurants
in Venezuela to teach multinationals a lesson. Ironically, while communist-ruled China
is going out of its way to attract foreign investors, several nominally capitalist Latin
American countries seen to be trying to keep investors away (Oppenheimer, 2008).
Latin America’s most troubling trend is its stagnation in education, science and
technology. While the Chinese are creating increasingly highly skilled labor forces, most
Latin American countries have barely modified their outdated educational systems (Hill,
2007). An example that Oppenheimer provides in Cuentos Chinos about the difference in
education is that in China, children in all public schools begin English-language classes
in third grade, fours hours a week. In Mexico, public-school students start studying
English in the seventh grade two hours a week (Oppenheimer, 2005).
Latin America’s global economic competitiveness ranks low and it is clearly
eroding according to the latest rankings of both the World Economic Yearbook and the
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report. The highest-ranking Latin
American nation, Chile, comes in at 23rd in the latter report, with the next two places
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occupied by Mexico at 55th and Brazil at 65th (WEF, 2007), China ranks 11th (Marshall,
2006).
Regrettably, Latin America has not yet built a sustainable culture of
competitiveness. The region’s historical development, the institutions it has created and
the leaders it has produced for the most part, have impeded the establishment of healthy,
thriving societies where self-reliance, good governance, social justice, democratic
capitalism and effective and transparent institutions prevail, and institutions matter a
great deal (North, 1993).
It is recognized that Latin America has made significant progress during the last
two decades in a number of areas that relate to economic competitiveness. These areas
include prudent fiscal and monetary policies, privatizations, economic liberalizations and
primary school enrollment. However, as Eduardo Fernandez-Arias and Peter Montiel
found in their study Reform and Growth in Latin America: All Pain, No Gain, there has
been insufficient depth and breadth of macroeconomic reform and a lack of structural and
institutional second generation reforms (Fernandez-Arias & Montiel, 2001).
If Latin America is to develop and sustain a culture of competitiveness, which is a
necessity not a choice, in today’s global economy, it needs to undertake a number of
measures. First measure would be to expedite and intensify economic liberalization. It is
important to ensure continued, deeper efforts to achieve macroeconomic reforms,
including in areas where there has been slippage in recent years, such as public sector
financial management and energy privatization. The second measure would be to adopt
and implement second generation reforms. Prudent fiscal and monetary policies are
necessary, but conditions are insufficient to achieve prosperity to all. Non-economic
106

measures to improve education, health care, housing, social services and infrastructure
are essential.
Another measure would be to institute comprehensive microeconomic reforms.
Microeconomic issues are the ones that are felt most directly by business, workers and
consumers (The Gazette, 2007, March 30). Foremost among the microeconomic issues
in need of reform are: regulations, taxation, administration of justice, labor, research and
development and financial services. In the World Bank’s “Doing Business in 2006,” for
business regulations in 14 countries, Latin America’s poor performance is nearly as
miserable as that of Africa. In Brazil it takes 152 different steps and five months to start
a business versus less than two nights in China (World Bank, 2006). Regulatory burdens
are most harmful to small business and start-ups, the largest private employers in Latin
America.
Most tax systems in the region are characterized by high rates and low collection.
Also, corporate tax rates are higher than those in China. This is why tax evasion and
capital flight are rampant.
Latin American labor rules raise costs, create barriers to entry and introduce
rigidities in the employment structure. These include the restrictive regulation on hiring
and firing practices as well as burdensome social insurance schemes. While salaries may
be low by industrialized nation standards, non-salary costs such as benefits, labor
production taxes and severance can double the cost of labor. Hiring a worker is easy.
Firing a worker is lengthy and costly.
Despite some progress, Latin America’s banking industry is inadequate,
conservative, complicated and cumbersome. For the most part, bank activity is
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dominated by trading government paper. The financing that is provided is often in
syndicate for large preferred borrowers. If it was not for the proliferation of credit cards
and retailers providing credit to customers, such as Elecrta’s Banco Azteca in Mexico,
the working class would have even less access to consumer goods (Thompson, 2007).
Latin America is becoming increasingly uncompetitive in a competitive world. In
Cuentos Chinos, a book by Miami Herald columnist Andres Oppenheimer, Argentine
education minister Daniel Filmus writes, “for the past 30 years, Argentina has not had a
culture of excellence, nor a culture of effort, nor a culture of hard work. Our culture has
rather been one of cutting corners and trying to pass the grade rather than seeking
excellence through effort, hard work and research” (Oppenheimer, 2005).
In historical context, the region’s descent is even more revealing. Between 1880
to 1930, Argentina was one of the world’s ten wealthiest nations. Before 1959, Cuba’s
economic and social indicators ranked among the highest in the world. While the world
spread adoption of neoliberal reforms begun in the 1980’s has been laudable and highly
significant, it has not been enough to create global competitiveness. Meanwhile, China
has extended, deepened and quickened their economic reforms during the past decade
(Tyler, 2006).
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion
This thesis has suggested that culture clearly matters for economic development.
Culture is a dynamic process in and through which people define who they are, what they
desire, and how they seek to realize their goals. From casual experience to formal
analysis, it is evident that culture exerts real and effects on development outcomes and
development projects. Ignoring culture has measurable consequences. Taking culture
into account requires integrating information about culture into development economic
analyses in an informed way.
The values of a culture have a decisive weight in economic development.
Throughout this paper, it can be seen that there has been debate on the types of values,
which have helped countries to attain sustained growth and significant social
achievements. If the dominant values are concentrated on individualism, indifference to
the fate of others, lack of collective responsibility, lack of interest in the general good, the
pursuit of personal enrichment as the central value, consumerism, and similar goals, the
consequent forms of conduct may be expected to cause serious harm to the fabric of
society and to lead to all kinds of regressive effects, ranging from severe economic
inequity. This gives rise to serious hindrances to sustained economic development.
Research affirms the importance of cultural understanding to the development of
partnership with international constituents (Baldauf, Cravens, and Wagner, 2000). I hope
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to have accomplished my reasoning as to why China has passed Latin America in the
economic aspect by using economic culture. China has strong cultural ties with three of
the industrialized economies (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore). These ties go beyond
sharing a common language, since the majority of people in these source regions are
ethnic Chinese.
In review, the success of China in attracting FDI has been attributed to a variety
of factors including market size, low costs of labor, liberalized FDI policy, political
stability and improved infrastructure. While these factors do to some extent facilitate
large inflows of FDI, less emphasized are China’ natural sources. Although policy
measures that improve political and macroeconomic stability as well as business
environment are always at the disposal of policy makers, many natural advantages are
country specific. The part of FDI in China that is due to natural advantages such as
culture is not likely to be reproduced by other countries through economic policy
(Marshall, 2006).
Latin America is a major player in the world economy. Although there are
numerous national distinctions, the countries can be thought of as distinct region, sharing
significant cultural, linguistic, political and economic characteristics. However, the
region is typified as developing. The region is characterized by deep-seated difficulties
in creating locally owned, innovative industries based on scientific and technological
knowledge.
Enterprises in Latin America seem to have a culture that limits their ability to
cooperate, especially when trying to make new innovations. Unfortunately, the state
tends not to send clear long-term signals favoring the need for innovation and sponsoring
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the elements that make it happen. Latin America tends to have a culture where
information is hoarded, not shared. This results in a duplication of efforts,
underutilization of available resources and a mismatch between supply and demand.
Industrial innovation in Latin America faces significant and deep-seated difficulties.
In Latin America, the concept of the informal sector was readily adopted by the
ILO’s Regional Employment program, known by its Spanish acronym PREALC. The
economic goal of informal enterprise is to ensure the survival of the individual and his or
her immediate family in contrast to the goal of capitalist enterprise, which is to generate
and accumulate profits (PREALC, 1981). This view was negatively looked on because
informal enterprises were depicted as a simple survival mechanism.
An alternative theory of informality was attributed by Hernando de Soto. He
attributed the origins of informality to excess regulation of the economy. According to
this view, the mercantilist Latin American state survives by granting the privilege of legal
participation in the economy to a narrow elite. De Soto argued that popular disregard for
legal restrictions leads to de facto deregulation of the economy. More than a survival
mechanism in response to insufficient job creation, informality also represents the
irruption of real market forces in an economy straight jacketed by mercantilist regulation.
The role of personal networks and institutional involvement as facilitators of FDI
should not be overstated. The prevalence of personal networks and institutional
involvement would probably discourage foreign investors who lack the appropriate links
from entering the regions, which would hamper the creation of a fair investment
environment in the long term. However, my point in this thesis is that the use of personal
networks and institutional involvement can provide an alternative way to solve some of
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the problems that underdeveloped regions face. For a transitional economy, this could be
a practical and feasible solution to current regional problems.
It is still too simplistic to attribute the different economic performance between
China and Latin America solely to cultural differences. In other words, Confucianism
cannot be the only answer to China’s past success and for Latin America, the IberoCatholic culture is not the single cause of its relatively bad economic performance.
However, the cultural approach has opened a door for us to see why economic
performance is different among regions and countries. As Alvin Y. So and Stephen W.K.
Chiu point out, the cultural approach is not aimed at reducing economic development to a
set of cultural traits (So, and Chiu, 1995). Rather, it relates development policy options
and institutional choices to certain cultural antecedents that make the reason for such
elections easier to be understood. In other words, cultural perspective provides
researchers with a frame of reference within which they can see how values, attitudes,
practices or behaviors have influenced economic development in China and Latin
America. This can be seen in the differences between family businesses in China and
Latin America. For example, as suggested by Brenes and Madrigal, in Latin America, if
family members strengthen their focus on the business philosophical area and family
integration, difficulties commonly found in family businesses would not be expected to
lead to family conflict and disruption (Brenes and Madrigal, 2003).
Culture plays an important role in economic performance, as it can affect people’s
behaviors and attitudes towards savings, education, work ethic, and so on. Of all the
factors determining economic performance, economic factors always stand on top.
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Each culture has its own unique positive or negative components, but the positive
ones cannot automatically create better economic performance in the absence of other
necessary conditions like sound economic policies, effective institutions, favorable world
economic situations, and political stability. In other words, only in a favored economic
and political environment can culture trigger economic growth. This point might help
explain why China made remarkable economic achievements during the past decades of
economic reform.

113

Bibliography
Akerlof, G and R. Kranton. (2006). Economics and Identity. Quarterly Journal of
Economics.
Alexander, K.C and P.P. Kumaran. (1992). Culture and Development: Cultural Pattern
in Areas of Unveven Development, Cambridge: Sage Publications.
Amin, A. (1999). An Institutional perspective on regional economic development.
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 23:365
Ando, M. and F. Kimura. (2003). Fragmentation and Agglomeration Matter: Japanese
Multinationals in Latin America and East Asia. North American Journal of
Economic and Finance, 14:3, 287-317.
Ando, M. and F. Kimura. (2004). The Formation of International
Production/Distribution Networks in East Asia. Chicago, The University of
Chicago Press.
Auyero, Javier. (2000). The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic
Account.” Latin American Research Review, 35:3.
Baldauf, A, D.W. Cravens; and U. Wagner. (2000). Examining determinants of Export
Performance in small Open Economies. Journal of Wold Business, 35:1, 61-79.
Bank of Canada chief seeks aid for Americas; Latin countries left behind by Asia. (2007,
March 30). The Gazette (Montreal).
Bekaert, G, C.R. Harvey’ and C. Lundblad. (2004). Governments Matters: Governance
Indicators for 1996-2004. Draft.
Bell, J.H.J. (1996). Foreign entry, cultural barriers, and learning. Strategic Management
Journal, 17, 151-166.
Benjamin, D., and L. Brandt. (1997). Land, Factor Markets, and Inequality in Rural
China: Historical Evidence. Explorations in Economic History, 34, 460-494.
Bian, Yanjie, and Soon Ang. (1997). Guanxi Networks and Job Mobility in China and
Singapore. Social Forces, 75:181.
114

Birch, David. (1979). The Job Generation Process. Cambridge, MA: MIT Program on
Neighborhood and Regional Change.
Blanchard, O, Schleifer, A. (2000). Federalism with and without Political Centralization:
China vs. Russia. NBER working paper, 7616.
Boisot, Max and Child, John. (1996). From fiefs to Clans and network capitalism:
explaining China’s emerging economic order. Administrative Science Quarterly,
41:4.
Bradley, David and Evelyne Huber, Stephanie Moller, Francios Nielson, and John
Stephens. (2003). Distribution and Redistribution in Post-industrial Democracies.
World Politics, 55:193.
Benabou, R and J. Tirole. (2006). Beliefs in a Just World and Redistributive Politics;
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Brenes, E, Madrigal, K. (2003). Anticipando el conflicto en los negocios familiars.
INCAE, 13:3.
Brooks, R, and R. Tao. (2003). China’s Labor Market Performance and Challenges. IMF
Working Paper WP03/210. Washington, D.C. U.S. International Monetary Fund.
Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. (2003). The Economic History Of Latin America Since
Independence, Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Canache, Damarys. (2002). Venezuela: Public Opinion and Protest in a Fragile
Democracy. Coral Gables: North-South Centern Press.
Carlock, R and Ward, J. (2001). Strategy planning for the family businesses: parallel
planning to unify the family and business. London: Palgrave.
Chang, Kuong-Chih. (1983). Art, Myth, and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in
Ancient China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Chen, A. (2005). Secret Societies and organized crime in contemporary China. Modern
Asian Studies, 39:2.
Chen, Y. (2000). National policy research on the development of the middle and the
western parts of China. Beijing: Economic Management Press.
Child, John. (2005). Organization: Contemporary Principles and Practices. Oxford:
Blackwell.
China State Statistical Bureau (1998). China Statistical Yearbook 1998, Beijing: China
Statistical Publishing House.
115

Coatsworth, John H., and Alan M. Taylor. (1998). Latin America and the World
Economy Since 1800, London, England: Harvard University Press.
Cohen, S, and G. Fields. (1998). Social Capital and Capital Gains, or Virtual Bowling in
Silicon Valley. Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy. Berckeley,
University of California.
Colomer, Joseph M and Luis E Escatel. (2004). “The Left-Right Dimension in Latin
America.” Working paper SDTEP 165, Centro de Investigacion y Docencia
Economicas: Mexico City.
Cook, S. (1999). Surplus Labour and Productivity in Chinese Agriculture: Evidence from
Household Survey Data. Journal of Developmental Studies 35, 16-44.
Davis, J, and R. Tagiuri. (1986). Bivalent Attributes of Family Business. Unpublished
manuscript, Owner Managed Business Institute, Santa Barbara, California.
De Brauw, A. (2002). Three Essays on Migration, Education, and Development in Rural
China. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Agriculture and Resource
Economies, University of California.
De Ferranti, David, Guillermo E. Perry, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, and Michael Walton.
(2004). Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History? Washington, DC:
The World Bank.
De George, and Richard T. (1993). Competing with Integrity. New York: Oxford
University Press.
De La Garza Toledo, E. (March, 1996). Latin America: Neoliberalism, New Productive
Paradigms, and Labor. Paper presented at the International Labor Process
Conference, Manchester, England, 9-11.
Della Porta, Donatella. (2002). “Social Capital, Beliefs in Government, and Political
Corruption.” In Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral
Countries? Eds. S. Pharr, and R. Putman, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
De Soto, Hernando. (1989). The Other Path: The Informal Revolution. New York:
Harper and Row.
Dicken, P. (1992). Global shift: Industrial change in a turbulent world. London: Harper
and Row.
Dittmer, Lowell. (1995). Chinese informal politics. The China Journal, 34:7.
116

Doh, J. (2000). Entrepreneurial privatization strategies: Order of entry and local partner
collaberation as source of competitive advantage. Academy of Management
Review, 25, 551-572.
Donaldson, T. (1996). Values in Tension: Ethics Away from Home. Harvard Business
Review. 48-62.
Duckett, J. (2001). Bureaucrats in Business, Chinese-style: the lessons of market reform
and state entrepreneurialism in the People’s Republic of China. World
Development, 29:1.
Dunfee, T., N.C. Smith, and R. Warren. (1999). Social Contracts and Marketing Ethics.
Journal of Marketing, 63, 14-32.
Eakeley, D. (1997). China is Showing an Interest in the Rule of Law. The National Law
Journal, A23.
Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean. (2004). Social Panorama of
Latin America, UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Economic Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 252, Econometric Society.
Faure, G., and G. Sjostedt. (1993). “Culture and Negotiaton: An Introduction.” In
Culture and Negotiation, ed G. Faure and Rubin, Newbury Park: Sage
Publications.
Fernandez-Kelly, and Jon Shefner. (2006). Out of the Shodows, University Park, PA: The
Pennsylvania State University Press.
Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo. (2005). Reforming Latin America’s Economies. New York, NY:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Friedman, Thomas L. (2000). The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York, NY: Anchor.
Fukuyama, F., (1995). Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New
York, NY: Free Press.
Garten, J.E. (1998). Opening the Doors for Business in China. Harvard Business Review,
76:3, 167-175.
Gates, Hill. (1996). China’s Motor: A Thousand Years of Petty Capitalism. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Gould, Erik. (2006, October 17). High Crimes Stifles Latin Economies. New York
Times, p. 23.
117

Gramsci, Antonio. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebook, ed. Q Hoare and G.N.
Smith: NY.
Greif, A. (1989). Reputation and Coalitions in Midieval Trade: Evidence on the
Maghribe Traders. Journal of Economic History, 49:4, 857-882.
Greif, A. (1994). Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A historical and
theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualistic societies. Journal of
Political Economy; 102:5.
Grosse, Robert. (1997). Restrictive Business Practices in International Service Industries.
Transnational Corporations, 6:2.
Guthrie, D. (1998). The Declining Significance of Guanxi in China’s Economic
Transition. The China Quarterly, 154, 254-282.
Hall, Edward T and Mildred Reed Hall. (1990). Understanding Cultural Differences,
New York: Intercultural Press, Inc.
Hall, P. A., Soskice. D. (2001). Varieties of Capitalism: the Institutional Foundations of
Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harrison, L. (1985). Underdeveloped is a state of mind, Cambridge: University of Press
of America.
Harrison, L. (1992). Who Prospers? How Culture Values Shapes Economic and Political
Success, New York, NY: Basic Books.
Harriss-White, and B. White, G. (1996). Corruption, liberalization and democracy, IDS
Bulletin. 27:2
Harvey, D. (1988). “The geographical and geopolitical consequences of the transition to
flexible accumulation.” In America’s new market geography: Nation, region and
metropolis, ed G. Sternkeil and J. Hughes, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press.
Hickson, D.J., and D.S. Pugh. (2001). Management Worldwide. London, England:
Penguin Books.
Harrison, L., and S. Huntington. (2000). Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human
Progress, New York, NY: Basic Books.
Hefferman, S. (2005). Modern Banking, John Wiley and Sons Ltd.
Hill, Patrice. (2007, July 26). China becomes the growth engine; U.S. dislodged as
world’s pace-setter. The Washington Times.
118

Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s Consequences. International difference in Work-related
Values, Beverly Hills, California: Sage.
Hofstede, G., and M. Bond. (1988). Confucius and Economic Growth: New Trends in
Cultural Consequences. Organizational Dynamics, 16:4, 4-21.
Hongyi, Zhang. (1989). Rujia jingji sixiang (Confucianist Economic Thinking). Hunan
People’s Publishing House.
Inglehart, R. (2000). Globalization and Postmodern Values. Washington Quarterly, 23,
215-228.
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (2002). Facing up to Inequality in Latin
America, Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins.
International Labor Office. (1998). Yearbook of Labor Statistics, Geneva.
International Labor Office. (2003). Yearbook of Labor Statistic, Geneva.
Kahn, Herman. (1979). World Economic Development: 1979 and Beyond. New York:
Westview Press.
Kahn, M.H. (1996). A Typology of corrupt transactions in developing countries. IDS
Bulletin, 27:2
Khan, M.H, and Sundaram, JK. (2000). “The Cost of Crony Capitalism” in Woo, W.T,
Sachs, J.O, Schwab, K. (eds) The Asian Financial Crisis: Lessons for a Resilient
Asia, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kao, J. (1993). The Worldwide Web of Chinese Business. Harvard Business Revenue,
71, 24-36.
Kaufmann, D.A., and M. Mastruzzi. (May 2005). Governments Matters IV: Governance
Indicators for 1996-2004. Draft.
King, Ambrose Yeo-Chi (1991). Kuan-his and network-building: a sociological
interpretation. Daedalius, 120:2.
Kiong, Tong Chee, and Yong Pit Kee. (1998). Guanxi bases, Xinyong and Chinese
Business Networks. The British Journal of Sociology, 49:1.
Kirkpatrick, C. (1999). Financial Sector Regulation and Lessons of the Asian Crisis.
Development Policy Review, 17:3.

119

Knight, J., and L. Song. (May 2001). New Urban Labor Market Study. Paper presented at
CERDI Conference on Emergence of Markets in China, Claremont-Ferrand,
France.
Kroeber, A.L. and C. Kluckhohn. (1952). Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and
Definitions, Cambridge: Papers of the Peabody Museam of American Archeology
and Ethnology, Harvard University.
Lagos, Marta. (2006). Latin America, New Challenges-New Responses, Paper presented
at the Chatham House Conference.
Landes, David S. (1999) The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some are so Rich and
Some So Poor. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
Lane, K.P. (1998). “One Step Behind: Shaanxi in reform, 1978-1995.” In Provincial
Strategies of economic reform in post-Mao China: Leadership, politics and
implementation, ed. P.T.Y. Cheung, J.H. Chung, and Z.M. Lin, New York: M.E.
Sharpe.
Latinobarometro. (2002). Public Opinion Poll.
Lee, Chad-Sung. (2005). Income Inequality, Democracy, and Public Sector Size.
American Sociological Review, 70:158.
Liang, H.P. (2002). A speech at the Economic Forum on Business opportunities in
Shaanxi. Economic Forum on Business Opportunities in Shaanxi, Xiam, China.
February 10
Lewis, Oscar. (1950). An Anthropological Approach to Family Studies. American
Journal of Sociology, 55:5.
Lincoln, James (1996). Keiretsu networks and corporate performance in Japan.
American Sociological Review, 61:1.
Lindert, Kathy, Emmanuel Skoufias , and Joseph Shapiro. (2005). Redistributing Income
to the Poor and the Rich: Public Transfers in Latin American and the Caribbean.
World Bank, Oct. 24.
Liu, H. (1998). Old Linkages, new networks: the globalization of overseas Chinese
voluntary associations and its implications. Chinese Quarterly, 155:2.
Lomintz, Larissa. (1988). Informal Exchange Networks in Formal Systems: A
Theoretical Model. American Anthropologists. 90:42.
Lovett, S, L.C. Simmons, and R Kali. (1999). Guanxi versus the Market: Ethics and
Efficiency. Journal of International Business Studies, 30:2, 231.
120

Luna, Juan P, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. (2005). Political Representation in Latin
America: A Study of Elite-Mass Congruence in Nine Countries. Comparative
Political Studies, 38:388.
Marshall, Tyler. (2006, August 13). China Poised to dominate influence in Asia. The
Boston Globe, pg. A10
Marugami, T. (2003). The report on the 14th Questionnaire Survey of Foreign direct
investment in 2002. Journal of Research Insitute for Develoment and Finance, 14,
4-82.
Maudos, Joaquin, Jose Manuel Pastor, and Javier Quesada. (1997). “Technical Progress
in Spanish Banking.” In Jack Revell, ed The Recent Evolution of Financial
Systems, NY: St. Martin’s Press.
Mellor, J. (2004). State Capital and Individual Health Status, Working Paper.
Department of Economy, College of William and Mary.
Meng, X. (1995). The Role of Education in Wage Determination in China’s Rural
Industrial Sector. Education Economy, 3, 235-247.
Mingione, Enzo. (1991). Fragmented Societies: A Sociology of Economic Life beyond
the Market Paradigm. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), China. (2001).
Almanac of China’s Foreign economic relations and trade, 2001. Beijing: China
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Publishing House.
Morley, Samuel. (2001). The Income Distribution Problem in Latin America and the
Caribbean, Santiago: United Nations Press.
Naughton, B. (1996). China’s Emergence and Prospects as a Trading Nation. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 273-344.
Neace, M.B. (2004). The Impact of Low Trust on Economic Development: The Case of
Latin America. Review of Policy Research, 21:5.
Nikkel, M. (1995). Note Chinese Characteristics in Corporate Clothing: Questions of
Fiduciary Duty in China’s Company Law. Minnesota Law Review, 80, 503.
North, Douglass C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performances, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

121

OECD. (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). (1999).
Employment Protection and Labour Market Performance. Chapter 2 in
Employment Outlook. Paris OECD.
OECD. (2001). Trends in International Migration. OECD, Paris.
Oppenheimer, Andres. (2005). Cuentos Chinos, New York: Sudamericana.
Oppenheimer, Andres. (2008, January 13). Latin America is lagging: Someone tell its
Leaders. The Washington Post.
Payne, J.M., D. Zovatto, F. Carrillo Florez, and A. Allamand Zavala. (2002).
Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America.
Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank and International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
Pei, M. (2001). The Roots of China’s Corruption. Far East Economic Review, 15:2.
Peng, D. (2000). Ethnic Chinese Business Networks and the Asian Pacific Economic
Integration. African and Asian Studies, 35:2, 229-250.
Peng, M.W., and Y. Luo. (2000). Managerial ties and Firm Performance in a Transition
Economy: the Nature of a Micro-Macro link. Academy of Management Review,
21:2, 492-528.
Peng, Yushing. (2001). Chinese Townships and Villages as Industrial Corporations:
Ownership, Governance, and Productivity. American Journal of Sociology, 106:5.
Petras, James and Steve Vieux. (1997). Neoliberalism and class conflict in Latin
America; a comparative perspective on the political economy of structural
adjustment. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Powell, W.H.. (1990). “Neither Markets nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of
Organizations.” 295-336 in Research in Organizational Behavior, ed B.M. Staw
and L.L. Cummings. Greenwich: JAI Press.
Prasad, E. (2003). Medium-Term Determinants of Current Accounts in Industrial and
Developing Countries: An Empirical Exploration. Journal of International
Economics, 59:1, 47-76.
Prasad, E. (2005). Controlled Capital Account Liberalization: A Proposal. IMF Policy
Discussion Paper, 05/7.
PREALC. (1981). Sector Informal: Funcionamiento y politicas. Santiago de Chile:
PREALC.
122

Ramamurch, R. (1999). Why haven’t Developing Countries Privatized deeper and
faster? World Development, 27:1, 137-155.
Raunch, J., and A. Casella. (1998). Overcoming Informational Barriers to International
Resource Allocation: Price and Group Ties. National Bureau of Economic
Research. Working Paper, 6628
Raunch, J., and V. Trindade. (1999). Ethnic Chinese Networks and International Trade.,
National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper, 7189.
Redding, S. Gordon. (1991). “Weak organizations and strong linkages managerial
ideology and Chinese family business networks” in Gary Hamilton (ed). Business
Networks and Economic Development in East and South Asia, Hong Kong:
Center of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong.
Risse-Kappan, Thomas. (1995). Bringing Transnational Relations Back in, Cambridge
University Press.
Rostow, Walt W. (1960). The Stages of economic growth: a non-communist manifesto.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rubin, Kyna. (1995). Homeward bound. Far Eastern Economic Review, 15:1.
Ryan, C. (2004). ASEAN Recognition Big Plus for China. Australian Financial Review,
11.
Santiso, Javier. (2003). The Political Economy of Emerging Markets. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Salvucci, Richard J. (1996). Latin America and the World Economy, Lexington,
Massachusetts: D.C. Health and Company.
Schamis, H.E. (1999). Distribution coalitions and the politics of economic reform in
Latin America. World Politics, 51:1
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1993). Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
108:3.
So, Alvin, and S. Chiu. (1995). East Asia and the World Economy, Sage Publications, p.
8
Sen, K. (1997). Internal Migration, Centre-State Grants, and Economic Growth in States
of India, IMF. Staff Paper, 44, 283-289.
Sensenbrenner, J., and J. Sensenbrenner. (1994) Personnel Priorities. Chinese Business
Review, November-December: 40-45.
123

Smith, C.W. (1995). The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt. Journal of Finance, 50,
609-631.
Smyth, Russell. (2007, September 7). Success despite lack of democracy. The Age
(Melbourne, Australia) p. 10.
Sims, T.L., Schiff, JJ, and Jamis J. (2000). The Great Western Development Strategy.
China Business Review, 27:44.
Sun, H.H. (1999). Entry modes of multinational corporations into China market: A socioeconomic analysis. International Journal of Social Economics, 26:6.
Tapia, M. (2004). Ignorance, Fixed Costs, and the Stock Market Participation Puzzle.
The Summit of the Americas: Loveless Brothers. (2007, January 2004). The Economist.
Thomson, Eduardo. (2007, February 1). Too Little too Late. Latin Finance, pg. A15
Transparency International. (1997). Corruption Perception Index.
Transparency International. (2003). Corruption Perception Index.
Tsai, Kellee S. (2002). Back-Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China. Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Tsang, E. (1998). Can a Guanxi be a Source of Sustained Competitive Advantage for
Doing Business in China? Academy of Management Executive, 12:2, 64-73.
Tseng, W, and H. Zebregas., (2002). FDI in China: Some Lessons for other Countries.
IMF Policy Discussion Paper, PDP.
Tsui, A.S., and J. Farh. (1997). Where Guanxi Matters: Relational demography and
Guanxi in the Chinese Context. Work and Occupations, 24:1, 56-79.
Tung, R., and V. Worm. (1997). The Importance of Network for European Companies in
China. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Conference.
Turner, Frederick. (1995). “Reassessing political Culture” in Peter Smith (ed) Latin
America in Comparative Perspective: Westview Press.
UNCTAD. (1999). World Development Report. New York, NY and Geneva: United
Nations.
UNCTAD. (2000). What Explains the Boom of Foreign direct investment in China? Asia
and the Pacific. New York, NY and Geneva: United Nations.
124

UNCTAD. (2003). World investment report 2002: Transnational corporations and export
competitiveness overview.
U.S. Department of Commerce. (2002). U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Preliminary
Results from the 1999 Benchmark Survey. Economics and Statistics
Administration/Bureau of Economic Analysis, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Governmental Printing Office.
Vanden, Harry E., and Gary Prevost. (2006). Politics of Latin America, the Power Game,
New York: Oxford University Press.
Wagley, Charles. (1964). “Luso-Brazilian Kinship Patterns: The Persistence of a
Cultural Tradition.” In Politics of Changing in Latin America, ed by J. Mayer
and R. Weatherhead, NY: 188-189.
Wang, H. (1991). Lineage culture in contemporary China. Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin
Chubanshe.
Wang, H.Y. (2000). Informal institutions and foreign investment in China. Pacific
Review, 13:5.
Wang, Luollin. (1997). Report of Foreign Direct Investment in China. Economic
Management Publishing House, Beijing: Jingi.
Wang, S.G., and Hu, A.G. (1999). The Political economy of uneven development: The
Case of China. NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Weber, Max. (1951). The Religion of China. New York: Free Press.
Weber, Max. (1981). General Economic History. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Books.
Wederman, A. (2004). The Intensification of corruption in China. China Quarterly,
180:2.
Whyte, Martin, K. (1995). The Social Roots of China’s Economic Development. China
Quarterly, 144:999.
Wei-ming, Tu. (1996). Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education
and Economic Culture in Jan and the Four Mini-Dragons. Cambridge and
London: Harvard University Press.
Weingast, B. (1995). The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Presence,
Federalism and Economic Growth. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
34:2, 214-230.
125

Wiarda, H. (1992). “Introduction: Social Change, Political Development, and the Latin
America Tradition.” P. 20. in Politics and Social Change in Latin America: Still a
Distinct Tradition? Ed Howard S. Wiarda. New York, NY: Westview Press.
Williams, Robert. (2000). Party Finance and Political Corruption. New York, NY: St.
Martin’s Press.
Woehrer, C.E. (1988). “Ethnic Families in the Circumplex Model: Integrating Nuclear
with Extended Family System.” In The Circumplex Model: Systemic Assessment
and Treatment of Families, ed D. Olson, S.C. Russell, and D.H. Sprenkle. New
York, NY: Haworth Press.
Woods, Catherine. (2007, July 25). From one emerging market to another: PwC Brazil
looks to China. International Accounting Bulletin, pg. 2.
World Bank. (1997). World Development Report, Washington, D.C.: Oxford University
Press.
World Bank. (2002). World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets.
Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press.
World Bank. (2003). World Development Report: Global Development Finance.
Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press.
World Bank. (2006). World Development Report: Doing Business in 2006. Washington,
D.C.: Oxford University Press.
World Economic Forum. (2007). Global Competitiveness Report. New York, NY:
Palgrave Macmillan.
World Values Survey (WVS). (1995-1997). Ann Arbor: ICPSR: University of Michigan.
Wright, P.C.., Szeto, W.F. Cheng. L.T.W (2002). Guanxi and professional conduct in
China: a management development perspective. International Journal of Human
Resource Management,13:1.
Xuewen, Dong. (1997). The Coordinated Development of the Relationship between
Culture and Economics and Politics, Beijing: People’s Daily.
Xian, Gao. (1996). Culture and Development: Macro-cultural Reflection on
Development, in Culture link.
Xin, K. R., and J.L. Pearce. (1996). Guanxi Connections as Substitute for Formal
Institutions Support. Academy of Management Journal, 39:6, 1641-1658.
126

Yang, Mayfair Mei-hui (1994). Gifts, Favors and Banquets: the Art of Social
Relationships in China, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Yeung, H., and K. Olds. (2000). “Globalizing Chinese Business Firms: Where are they
coming From, Where are they Heading?” in Globalization of Chinese Business
Firms. Ed. H. Yeung and K. Olds. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.
Zhang, K. (2001). What Explains the Boom of Foreign Direct Investment in China?
Economia Internazionale LIV, 2, 251-274.
Zedong, Mao. (1952). “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War”,
in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. II. Beijing: People’s Publishing House.

127

